the failure of the Office of Selective Service to meet Army quotas, the
ceiling of 7,700,000 approved by the President in November 1943 was not
reached until March 1944. Not only was the Army short more than 200,000 men
at the end of 1943, it also contained large groups--such as those soldiers
studying in the colleges under the Army Specialized Training
Program--that could not be immediately employed. Manpower squeezes,
together with strategic, logistical, and operational considerations,
helped to change the shape as well as the size of the Army during 1943.
The reduction of the early 1943 Troop Basis of 8,208,000 to 7,700,000 men in
November had been accomplished by the more or less general acceptance of the
90-division limit as the "cutting edge" necessary to win the war. Within
this limit the character of the cutting edge changed considerably. There was
a definite trend toward increasing infantry and airborne divisions during
1943 since strategic and tactical demands as well as the need to save
shipping space favored the use of forces that were not so heavily armed or
so completely motorized. As a result, a decrease in the rate of activation
of armored divisions took place and motorized infantry divisions were
reconverted to standard infantry divisions. At the end of 1942 there had
been fifty-two infantry, two cavalry, fourteen armored, two airborne, and
four motorized divisions in the Army--seventy-four in all. One year later
there were ninety divisions in existence--sixty-seven infantry, two cavalry,
sixteen armored, and five airborne. The sixteen new divisions activated
during 1943 represented less
than half the number of divisions--thirty-eight--activated in 1942.
Accumulation of activated and trained divisions in the United States began
to mount during 1943 because of the lack of over-all strategic decisions,
the imbalances in shipping, and the strain on port
capacities.2
Training camps were crowded and it was difficult to activate additional
divisions--only thirteen moved overseas during the year as compared with
seventeen in 1942. This left sixty divisions in various stages of readiness
scattered over the United States. Many were neither at full strength nor
fully equipped, since replacements often had to be drawn from the newer
divisions and the equipping of French divisions in North Africa had produced
some shortages.3
When the new demands for manpower were made in late 1943 to operate the B-29's,
to provide for the rotation program, and to keep the Army Specialized
Training Program going on a reduced basis, any possibility of organizing
another fifteen divisions in 1944 as had been planned in mid-1943, appeared
doomed.4
As in 1942, the distribution of strength within the Army
shifted greatly--and again in favor of air and service troops. Here,
favorable circumstances helped the Army to meet the changing needs of global
warfare. The fine showing of the Soviet Union on the Eastern Front and the
increased effectiveness of the Combined Bomber Offensive meant that fewer
U.S. ground troops than originally planned would be required to defeat the
Axis Powers. Meanwhile, acceptance of the 90-division limit, placing a curb
on the growth of the ground forces, permitted a greater proportion of the
1943 accrual to be devoted to strengthening the air and service forces. The
intensification of the air war against both Germany and Japan during this
build-up period and the development and improvement of the long lines of
communications all over the world to supply the far-flung U.S. forces kept
on augmenting the air and service totals. By the end of the year, the number
of men in the service branches totaled 2,735,076, an increase of 47 percent;
those in the ground arms 2,451,007, an increase of 26 percent; and those in
the Air Corps 1,810,900, a 42 percent increase. For the first time during
the war, troops in the service branches outnumbered those in the ground
arms.5
The number of air groups had climbed steadily at about the same rate
of speed as in 1942, rising from 136 at the end of 1942 to 220 a year later.
At the same time, the limits imposed upon ground combat
troops inevitably focused Army attention upon the replacement problem. Until
the bulk of the ground units were committed to action, they would be subject
to further raids upon their personnel and equipment to provide replacements
for divisions already engaged in combat. With the great campaign of the war
looming ahead, this problem, the planners realized, would have to be
resolved if an adequate and prepared strategic reserve were to be on hand to
cope with possible setbacks.
Expansion of the Army Overseas
In spite of the lack of over-all plans and the persistent
shipping imbalances, the total overseas strength of the Army had increased
from 1,064,643--including 17 divisions and 72 air groups--at the end of 1942
to 2,618,075--including 30 divisions and 136 air groups-a- year later. At the close
of 1943 some 35 percent of the total Army personnel were out of the country
as contrasted with only 20 percent at the end of 1942. During the same
period the strength of the Army deployed against Germany and Japan rose from
841,512 to 2,328,427, an increase of over 275 percents.6
On the other hand,
the distribution of these Army forces did not proceed exactly as the Army
planners had intended, although the deployment totals were fairly close to
the planners' estimates of early 1943. Table 3, based on deployment against
Germany and Japan, contrasts the planners' estimates of late March 1943 for
the end of the year with the actual deployment at the end of the year. The
history of the war during 1943 is reflected in these figures--mounting
deployment to the Mediterranean and Pacific, growing costs of the China
commitment, and neglect of the build-up in the United Kingdom for the
cross-Channel attack. Here, in its simplest form, is the story of the United
States' course in the war during 1943.
Deployment to the United Kingdom
Of all the main areas of deployment, the European theater was affected most
during 1943 by the failure to carry out the proposed build-up. The planners'
TABLE 3--PLANNERS' DEPLOYMENT ESTIMATES OF MARCH 1943 AND
ACTUAL DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES 31 DECEMBER 1943
| Area |
Planned for 31 December 1943 |
Actual Deployment |
| Atlantic |
1,510,700 |
1,416,485 |
| British Isles |
1,026,000 |
768,274 |
| Mediterranean |
432,700 |
597,658 |
| Africa and Middle East (including Persian Gulf Command) |
52,000 |
50,553 |
| Pacific-Far East |
753,440 |
912,942 |
| Pacific |
594,340 |
696,847 |
| China-Burma-India |
48,100 |
94,560 |
| Alaska |
111,000 |
121,535 |
Source: (1) JCS 243, 27 Mar 43, title: Strategic Deployment of U.S. Forces
for 1943. (2) STM-30, 1 Jan 48.
ambitious scheme of early 1943 to station over a million
men in the United Kingdom by the beginning of 1944 collapsed as the demands
of the Mediterranean and Pacific, the tight shipping situation, and the
inactive status of the theater itself as far as ground operations were
concerned combined to prevent the projected expansion. In the last half of
the year, the increase of the bomber offensive and the transfer of four
divisions from the Mediterranean helped to make up some of the deficit, but
the rise from 119,702 men on 31 December 1942 to 768,274 a year later
still fell over a quarter of a million men short of the planners'
estimates.7
Only one division, the 29th Infantry, had been located in
the United Kingdom in December 1942. (See Table 4.) It was to remain the
only major U.S.
ground force in the area as late as 31 July 1943. Ten divisions arrived
during the last five months of the year four from the Mediterranean (1st and
9th Infantry, 82d Airborne, and 2d Armored), one from Iceland (5th
Infantry), and five from the United States (2d, 8th, and 28th Infantry,
101st Airborne and 3d Armored).
In the meantime, the fifteen air groups present in the United Kingdom at the
end of 1942 increased to more than fifty-two groups a year later; the
aircraft strength had almost quintupled.8
Some 294385 personnel, almost 40
percent of the total stationed in the United Kingdom, belonged to the Air
Forces. The late spurt in deployment and the final decision at SEXTANT to
undertake OVERLORD offered the prospect that, at long
|
Personnel |
Divisions |
Air Combat Groups |
Aircraft |
| 31 Dec 42 |
31 Dec 43 |
31 Dec 42 |
31 Dec 43 |
31 Dec 42 |
31 Dec 43 |
31 Dec 42 |
31 Dec 43 |
| Deployed Against Germany |
| Total against Germany |
377,644 |
1,416,485 |
8 |
17 |
40 |
93 |
2,065 |
8,237 |
| European theater |
119,702 |
768,274 |
2b
Infantry: 5th, 29th |
11
Infantry: 1st, 2d, 5th, 8th, 9th, 28th, 29th
Armored: 2d, 3d Airborne: 82d, 101st |
15c |
52c |
944d
219 heavy bombers
29 medium bombers
16 light bombers
516 fighters
67 reconnaissance
25 transports
72 miscellaneous |
4,6184d
1,686 heavy bombers
444 medium bombers
53 light bombers
1,866 fighters
193 reconnaissance
253 transports
123 miscellaneous |
| Mediterranean theater |
227,092 |
597,658 |
6
Infantry: 1st, 3d, 9th, 34th
Armored: 1st, 2d |
6
Infantry: 3d, 34th, 36th, 45th, 88th
Armored: 1st |
25c |
41c |
1,121d
150 heavy bombers
150 medium bombers
43 light bombers
542 fighters
48 reconnaissance
188 transports |
3,619d
577 heavy bombers
640 medium bombers
114 light bombers
1,590 fighters
75 reconnaissance
596 transports
27 miscellaneous |
| Middle East |
30,850 |
50,553 |
|
|
(e) |
(e) |
(e) |
(e) |
| Deployed Against Japan |
| Total against Japan |
463,868 |
912,942 |
9 |
13 |
23 |
41 |
1,910 |
4,254 |
| Pacific |
350,720 |
696,847 |
9
Infantry: 24th, 25th, 27th, 324, 37th, 40th, 41st, 43d, Americal |
13
Infantry: 6th, 7th, 24th, 25th, 27th, 32d, 33d, 37th, 40th, 41st, 43d, Americal
Cavalry: 1st |
17 |
32 |
1,343
216 heavy bombers
140 medium bombers
29 light bombers
803 fighters
31 reconnaissance
82 transports
42 miscellaneous |
3,073
532 heavy bombers
428 medium bombers
179 light bombers
1,327 fighters
93 reconnaissance
427 transports
87 miscellaneous |
| CBI |
17,087 |
94,560 |
|
|
4 |
7 |
271
32 heavy bombers
43 medium bombers
184 fighters
11 reconnaissance
1 transport |
933
167 heavy bombers
84 medium bombers
422 fighters
58 reconnaissance
79 transports
123 miscellaneous |
| Alaska |
96,061 |
121,535 |
|
|
2 |
2 |
296
33 heavy bombers
58 medium bombers
6 light bombers
161 fighters
2 reconnaissance
27 transports
9 miscellaneous |
248
17 heavy bombers
32 medium bombers
148 fighters
1 reconnaissance
39 transports
11 miscellaneous |
| Caribbean Deployment |
| Caribbean |
119,286 |
91,466 |
|
|
9 |
2 |
539
51 heavy bombers
65 medium bombers
12 light bombers
262 fighters
36 reconnaissance
38 transports
75 miscellaneous |
574
43 heavy bombers
97 medium bombers
5 light bombers
262 fighters
47 reconnaissance
56 transports
64 miscellaneous |
-
The personnel figures include ground, air, and service troops. They
are based upon STM-30, 1 January 1948. The totals for air combat groups
and aircraft are based upon
USAF Statistical Digest, 1947,
unless otherwise noted.
-
The 5th Infantry Division was stationed in Iceland until October 1943.
-
The totals of air combat groups for the European and Mediterranean
Theaters were received from the USAF, Directorate of Statistical Services.
No such breakdown is given in the
USAF Statistical Digest, 1947,
and there are discrepancies
between the 1945 AAF Digest and 1947 USAF Digest in the totals for the two theaters.
-
The totals of aircraft in the European and Mediterranean Theaters
are based on AAF Statistical Digest, 1945, since no such breakdown is given in the
USAF Statistical Digest, 1947.
-
Middle East aircraft figures are included in the Mediterranean figures.
--392/393--
last, top priority would be accorded to the U.K. augmentation--ground as well
as air.
Deployment to the Mediterranean and Middle East
In the Mediterranean the Army deployment, continuing the trend begun with
the landings in North Africa in late 1942, mounted steadily until November
1943. Despite American reluctance to expand Mediterranean operations, the
forces in being in the area and the advantages, both political and military,
of whittling down German strength on the ground as well as in the air
inevitably created pressures that led to further campaigns in the
Mediterranean. The momentum generated by the TORCH operation produced the
Sicilian and Italian campaigns, which caused the planners' estimates of
March 1943 to be exceeded by about 150,000 men by the end of 1943. At the
end of 1942, when the Allies were engaged in North Africa, there were
227,092 U.S. troops in the Mediterranean area; twelve months later, when the
scene of battle had shifted northward to Italy, there were 587,658 troops,
an increase of 370,566, in the Mediterranean theater.
In the closing months of 1943, as a result of further changes in war plans,
the Mediterranean began to lose strength to the United Kingdom. This
shift--reversing the flow of U.S. divisions from the United Kingdom begun in
late 1942--was particularly reflected in the fluctuation of divisional strength.
In December 1942 there were six Army divisions--the 1st, 3d, 8th, and 4th
Infantry and the 1st and 2d Armored--in the Mediterranean. With
the addition of the 36th and 45th Infantry and the 82d Airborne Divisions,
the area reached the peak of its expansion--nine divisions--in September
1943. By the close of 1943, however, the shipment of the four divisions to
the United Kingdom and the arrival of one fresh division in the
Mediterranean--the 88th Infantry-f-rom the United States left the area with
the same total it had begun the year--six.
The greater part of the increase in personnel over the twelve-month period
took place not in ground combat troops but in air and service troops. The
Air Forces climbed from twenty-five to forty-one groups and aircraft strength
more than tripled. Air Forces personnel mustered 142,790, or about one
fourth of the total in the area. The Mediterranean air forces not only
furnished air support for the land operations in Italy, they had also become
a valuable part of the Combined Bomber Offensive since they were able to
strike at objectives beyond the reach of the air forces based in the United Kingdom.
Only in the adjoining area--the Middle East--had the planners' estimates of
early 1941 been closely borne out. There, the 30,850 men present in
December 1942 increased to 50,553 a year later, just 1,500 short of the
estimate. As in the preceding year, the Army sought to remain as uninvolved
as possible in the internal problems of this area of British responsibility
and to keep its forces at a minimum. The sweep of the war northward in the
Mediterranean and toward Europe enabled the Army in 1943 to cut down its
commitments to the British in the Middle East--commitments that lead involved
considerable Army effort and personnel in the critical days
--394--
of 1942. At the same time, American aid to the other major European partner
in Europe--the Soviet Union--via the Middle East became all the more
important. All of the increase in American personnel in the Middle East in
1943 was devoted to furthering the development of the U.S. command in the
area consecrated to supplying the Russians over the southern route. In
December 1943 this trend was reflected in the formal separation of the
Persian Gulf Service Command from the jurisdiction of USAFIME and its
redesignation as a separate entity, the Persian Gulf Command.
Deployment Overseas in the Western Hemisphere
Changes in the over-all military situation were also
reflected in the decline of such essentially defensive areas as the
Caribbean. When the manpower situation became acute in early 1941, Marshall
ordered the defensive garrisons surveyed and reduced wherever possible. It
was natural that the Caribbean Defense Command, which had reached a total of
118,286 troops at the end of 1842, should feel the squeeze of economy. By
the close of 1943 its strength had been cut to 91,466. Although there was a
paper reduction in the number of air groups assigned to the Caribbean during
1943 From nine to two groups, the actual number of aircraft on hand
increased slightly during the year. The reduction in groups was accomplished
by removing the organized group designations and forming larger separate
squadrons. The possibility of nuisance sea raids and the threat of submarine
depredations led to the retention of air protection for this southern sea frontier.
The same trend was apparent in Alaska. During 1943 the
Alaskan command had grown from 96,061 at the beginning of the year to
148,167 in August 1943, when operations against Kiska were undertaken.
Following the departure of the Japanese from the Aleutians in July, a steady
decline in Army commitments set in, and by the end of 1943 there were 121,35
men in the Alaskan area. Two air groups were maintained in Alaska during the
year, but the number of squadrons in those groups was reduced from ten to
six and the number of assigned aircraft decreased slightly. The decline in
importance of overseas Western Hemisphere areas for Army ground deployment
reflected the War Department's realization that the shooting war had indeed
passed them by.
Deployment to the CBI
For the U.S. Army, the CBI continued to represent a
complicated web of political, military, and jurisdictional problems.
Although the Allies had won back very little territory from the Japanese on
the Asiatic mainland, the constant dilation of the U.S. commitment to the
area during 1943 resulted in an increase of over 500 percent in the number
of Army troops stationed in the CBI. The rise from 17,087 in December 1942
to 94,560 in December 1943 indicated the mounting costs involved in
sustaining the Chinese in the war against Japan. To the United States in
1943 the CBI remained--as in 1942--essentially an air and service theater. The
United States was pledged to open an overland line of communications to
China and was
--395--
attempting to build up an airlift in the meantime. Since the Army managed to
prevent the assignment of any U.S. combat divisions to the theater, the bulk
of allocations to the area in 1943 consisted of air and service troops. The
complexities of the intricate line of communications and the persistent
demands of the airlift drew in more and more manpower during 1943. A further
increase appeared in prospect for 1944 as preparations for the B-29 were
pushed forward.
There were seven air groups and six separate squadrons in the CBI at the end
of 1943, including over 40,000 Air Forces personnel, as against four groups
plus one squadron the previous December. Aircraft strength in the theater
more than tripled. The big problem for the Army in China was still
logistics, and until this was conquered definite limitations on the size
of Chennault's air forces would exist, especially since B-29 groups would soon
be on hand to further complicate the supply picture.
Deployment in the Pacific
In the Pacific, where the growing requirements of the offensive phase had
succeeded the piecemeal increases of the defensive and garrisoning stage,
Army deployment continued uninterrupted. The Guadalcanal Campaign had, as
had the North African operation, been as much offensive as defensive in
nature, and each had led to further demands as the initial momentum
increased. In 1943, as British pressures in the Mediterranean were matched
by U.S. pressures in the Pacific, deployment to the Pacific mounted
steadily. During most of the year U.S. and other Allied forces were employed
in step-by-step advances in the
South and Southwest Pacific. In the course of 1943 they advanced to
Bougainville in the Solomons and to the Huon Peninsula in New Guinea. The
close of the year found Allied forces invading the island of New Britain in
the Southwest Pacific and U.S. forces launching the great amphibious sweep
in the Central Pacific with the invasion of the Gilbert Islands. During the
course of these operations the Army forces scattered throughout the Pacific
almost doubled from 350,720 in December 1942 to 696,847 at the end of the
following year--an increase of over 100,000 more than the planners had
counted upon having in the Pacific according to their estimates of early
March 1943.
Thirteen Army divisions were stationed in the Pacific at the end of 1943 to
carry out the ambitious plans for the dual drive during 1944. Nine divisions
had been present in December 1942--the 24th, 25th, 27th, and 40th Infantry in
the Central Pacific; the Americal, 37th, and 43d Infantry in the South
Pacific; and the 32d and 41st Infantry in the Southwest Pacific. During
1943 four divisions arrived in the Pacific--the Central Pacific received the
6th and 33d Infantry from the United States and the 7th Infantry from
Alaska; the 25th Infantry arrived in the South Pacific from Hawaii; and the
Southwest Pacific got the 24th Infantry from Hawaii and the 1st Cavalry from
the United States. In contrast with deployment to the United Kingdom, all
four divisions sent from the mainland to the Pacific in 1943 arrived before
August, which marked the beginning of the accelerated build-up for the
cross-Channel invasion.
Deployment to the Pacific during 1941 continued to be a formidable exercise
--396--
in logistics. The enormous distances, the shortage of base and
communications facilities, and the imbalances in shipping affected--as in
1942--the character and extent of American deployment in this largely oceanic
theater. For every combat division sent to the area, twice as many service
troops were required for transport and supply. In the meantime, there was a
constant expansion in aircraft and air personnel. The number of air groups
in the Pacific increased from seventeen to thirty-two and the number of
aircraft more than doubled. The number of medium and light bombers, so
necessary in preparing for the step-by-step advance in New Guinea and the
island advance through the Solomons, almost quadrupled. Air Forces personnel
mounted to 162,376, roughly 23 percent of the total Army deployment in the
Pacific. With the launching of the Central Pacific drive in late 1943,
requirements for the Pacific area would continue to mount in preparation for
the more powerful and extended air and amphibious assaults of 1944.
The Tally Sheet
What do all these figures signify in terms of the war against Germany and
that against Japan? During 1943 the Army sent overseas close to a million
and a half men against the enemy, including 13 divisions and 8,516 aircraft.
Over two thirds of these totals, including more than 1,000,000 troops, 9
divisions, and over 6,000 aircraft were deployed against Germany.
When these figures are added to the totals sent overseas
in 1941-42, it is apparent that the balance was finally being redressed in
favor of the war against Germany. The cumulative totals at the end of 1943
showed 14 16,485 men, including 17 divisions and 8,237 aircraft deployed
against Germany, as opposed to 912,942 troops, including 13 divisions and
4,254 aircraft lined up against Japan--a sharp contrast to the picture at the
end of 1942, when in manpower and number of divisions the war against Japan
had maintained an edge over the war in Europe. The 1943 Army deployment
figures accorded far more closely with the Allied concept that Germany
should be beaten first and the main weight of Allied power should be brought
to bear upon that country. Approximately 60 percent of Army personnel and
over 65 percent of Army aircraft deployed against Germany and Japan were now
marshaled against Hitler. And even though the ratio of divisions was only 57
to 43 percent, the European divisional build-up was just on the verge of
burgeoning forth. The trend that had allowed the faster expansion of the
Pacific in 1942 was being definitely reversed.9
On the other hand, failure of the Allies to agree upon a specific plan for
the cross-Channel attack until SEXTANT had permitted deployment in the war
against Japan to develop at a much quicker pace than the planners had
expected in March 1943. It was not until October that the divisions in
Europe exceeded those in the Pacific-Far East.
Were the Army figures the sum total of the U.S. war effort, the conclusion
might be drawn that Americans were now fighting the multi-front war
according to their early concept of the primacy of the struggle in Europe.
But it would be quite erroneous to make any such
--397--
TABLE 5--U.S. OVERSEAS DEPLOYMENT: 31 DECEMBER 1943
| |
Against Germany |
Against Japan |
| Total |
European theatera |
Mediterranean theater |
Middle East theatersb |
Atlantic Oceanc |
Total |
Pacificd |
CBI |
Alaska |
| Personnel |
1,810,367 |
805,792 |
615,958 |
50,553 |
338,064 |
1,878,152 |
1,629,023 |
94,660 |
154,469 |
| Armye |
979,310 |
473,889 |
454,868 |
50,553 |
0 |
688,711 |
534,471 |
52,624 |
101,616 |
| Air Forcesf |
437,175 |
294,385 |
142,790 |
(g) |
0 |
224,231 |
162,376 |
41,936 |
19,919 |
| Navyh |
391,400 |
36,400 |
18,300 |
(g) |
336,700 |
804,800 |
772,800 |
100 |
31,900 |
| Marineh |
2,482 |
1,118 |
0 |
0 |
1,364 |
160,410 |
159,376 |
0 |
1,034 |
| Divisions |
17 |
11 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
16+ |
16+ |
0 |
0 |
| Army |
17 |
11 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
13 |
0 |
0 |
| Marine |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3+ |
3+ |
0 |
0 |
| Aircraft |
8,807 |
(i) |
(i) |
(i) |
(i) |
7,857 |
(i) |
(i) |
(i) |
| Army |
8,237 |
4,6181 |
3,619 |
(g) |
0 |
4,254 |
3,073 |
933 |
248 |
| Heavy bombers |
2,263 |
1,6861 |
577 |
(g) |
0 |
716 |
532 |
167 |
17 |
| Medium bombers |
1,084 |
444 |
640 |
(g) |
0 |
544 |
428 |
84 |
32 |
| Light bombers |
167 |
53 |
114 |
(g) |
0 |
179 |
179 |
0 |
0 |
| Fighters |
3,456 |
1,866 |
1,590 |
(g) |
0 |
1,897 |
1,327 |
422 |
148 |
| Reconnaissance |
268 |
193 |
75 |
(g) |
0 |
152 |
93 |
58 |
1 |
| Transports |
I 849 |
253 |
596 |
(g) |
0 |
545 |
427 |
79 |
39 |
| Miscellaneous |
150 |
123 |
27 |
(g) |
0 |
221 |
87 |
123 |
11 |
| Navy |
570 |
(i) |
(i) |
(i) |
(i) |
3,603 |
(i) |
(i) |
(i) |
| Bombers |
204 |
(i) |
(i) |
(i) |
(i) |
1,098 |
(i) |
(i) |
(i) |
| Fighters |
0 |
(i) |
(i) |
(i) |
(i) |
564 |
(i) |
(i) |
(i) |
| Carrier aircraft |
3661 |
(i) |
(i) |
(i) |
(i) |
1,941 |
(i) |
(i) |
(i) |
| Combat ships |
515 |
|
713 |
|
| Battleships |
61 |
2 new, 4 old j |
13 |
6 new, 7 old |
| Aircraft carriers |
10 |
1 large, 9 escort |
28 |
7 large, 7 light, 14 escort |
| Cruisers |
10 |
2 heavy, 3 light, 5 old light |
32 |
12 large, 13 light, 2 antiaircraft, 5 old light |
| Destroyers |
120 |
80 new, 40 old |
188 |
175 new, 13 old |
| Submarines |
40 |
6 new, 34 old |
123 |
105 new, 18 old |
| Destroyer escorts |
112 |
112 new |
57 |
57 new |
| LST's |
921 |
92 new |
125 |
125 new |
| LCI's |
1101 |
110 new |
99 |
99 new |
| Attack transports (APA) |
10 |
10 new |
34 |
34 new |
| Attack cargo (AKA) |
5 |
5 new |
14 |
14 new |
-
Includes Iceland.
-
Includes Persian Gulf Command.
-
South Atlantic Naval Forces.
-
Includes SWPA, SOPAC, and CPA totals for the
Army and POA totals for the Navy and Marine Corps.
-
All Army (including ground and service forces)
personnel figures are based on STM-30, Strength of the Army, 1
January 1948.
-
Air Forces personnel and aircraft figures are
based on AAF Statistical Digest, 1945, and
USAF Statistical Digest, 1947.
-
Air Forces and Navy personnel in the Middle East
Theater are included in the Mediterranean Theater totals.
-
All Navy and Marine figures are based upon
planners' estimates in JCS 521/3, 4 February 1944, title: Strategic
Deployment of U.S. Forces to 31 December 1944. Navy figures include
both shore-based and ship-based personnel. Marine figures for 31
December 1943--furnished by the Office of Navy Comptroller--show 5,827
marines in Atlantic area and 156,507 in the Pacific. It has been
impossible to reconcile Navy figures currently available with the
planners' estimates.
-
Distribution of Navy aircraft and combat ships on a
comparable geographical basis was not readily available.
-
As used here, the term "old" in general pertains
to ships constructed or under construction at the time of the
Washington Naval Conference of 1922. The bulk of the "new" vessels
were constructed after the expiration in 1936 of the 1922 and 1930
naval limitations agreements.
--398--
surmise without considering the effort being expended by the
Navy and the Marine Corps, which were very much in the war,
especially in the Pacific. Table 5 is an attempt to present in brief
an approximation of the total war effort overseas at the end of
1943. Despite its given qualifications, it may serve to dispel
somewhat the persistent illusion that the Pacific-Far East was being
forgotten or neglected during the second year of the war. MacArthur
and Nimitz were far from being forced to fight on a shoestring when
compared with the European commanders. After two years of war, the
balance of U.S. forces and resources between the European and
Japanese arenas was fairly even.
Although the over-all deployment totals of U.S. armed strength
against Japan showed a slight margin in personnel over that against
Europe, the latter held a narrow edge in divisions and a comfortable
lead in the number of aircraft. It should also be noted that the
bulk of the heavier types of aircraft were operating against
Germany. In the matter of transport aircraft, which were still in
short supply, the European theaters enjoyed a small advantage over
the Pacific-Far East. The Army had 849 in the former as opposed to
545 in the latter. This does not include about 165 planes that were
assigned to the Air Transport Command for the Hump airlift; if these
were added in, the totals would show some 710 in the war against
Japan, a figure that compares quite favorably with the 849 deployed
against Germany.10
The greater part of U.S. naval power, including most of the
newest combat ships, was stationed in the Pacific. Whereas Navy and
Marine personnel formed only 22 percent of the effort against
Germany, they composed over a half of the U.S. forces in the
Pacific. In distribution of aircraft, only 6 percent of the planes
in the Atlantic-Mediterranean area belonged to the Navy, while over
46 percent of those deployed in the Pacific bore Navy or Marine insignia.
Over-all figures on the amount of U.S. cargo shipping present in
individual areas are incomplete. Insofar as the shipping under Army
control is concerned, 549 ships, totaling 4,924,558 measurement tons
and a troop capacity of 353,948, were on the Atlantic-Mediterranean
run; 437 ships, totaling 3,837,287 measurement tons and a troop
capacity of 160,590, were in the Pacific-Far East.11
War Shipping
Administration cargo ships allocated to the Army and Navy as of 1
January 1944 totaled 4,290,000 deadweight tons in the Pacific and
5,300,000 dead-weight tons in the Atlantic.12
Army and WSA allocations thus gave an edge to the European war, with
approximately 55 percent of the shipping being devoted to the
struggle against Germany. However, cargo ships controlled outright
--399--
by the Navy are not included in these totals and inclusion of
these might modify the European advantage somewhat. Unfortunately,
the Navy figures on the distribution between the Atlantic and
Pacific of cargo shipping under its control at the end of 1943 are
not available.
Although no complete breakdown on the over-all distribution of
landing craft and combat loaders in all categories exists, the
preponderance of attack transports (APA's), attack cargo ships
(AKA's), and LST's was in the Pacific at the end of 1943, while the
European theaters enjoyed an edge in infantry landing craft (LCI's).
The whole problem of landing craft shortages is, to say the least,
puzzling. When the 1942 Production program was completed in early
1943, American military authorities made no immediate attempt to
establish a new program. Other urgent requirements for vessels such
as destroyer escorts to combat the submarine menace in the Atlantic
were placed at the top of the "must" lists. Despite the discussions
at QUADRANT On landing craft for OVERLORD and for Pacific
operations, there was a definite lull in construction during the
summer of 1945, especially in the larger types of landing craft.
During September and October the JCS approved increases in landing
craft production, but since the augmentations would be small until
the spring of 1944, OVERLORD would receive at best minor benefits
from this somewhat tardy action. A later acceleration of
production--in December following SEXTANT--promised mainly to aid the
Pacific. The lateness of the decision to accelerate the program, the
delay inherent in converting shipyards to landing craft production,
changes in design, the winter weather, and the crowded conditions
existing in most shipyards slowed down, construction at the end of
1943, when time was at a premium. Only a Herculean effort would
enable the goals set at SEXTANT to be met, and the prospects for
early 1944 were not very encouraging.
It is difficult to state with any certainty why the landing
craft deficiency was allowed to develop and grow for so long without
interference. The War Production Board did see the need for
increased production in August 1943. The delay until the fall of
1943 in setting up a new and expanded program has led some students
of industrial production to suggest that the principal strategic
planners were at fault for not anticipating the needs of 1944 early
enough to provide lead time for the builders to prepare for
increased demands.13
This explanation appears to oversimplify a
complex problem. The uncertainty about OVERLORD and Mediterranean
operations had not been definitely resolved at QUADRANT. The
submarine menace that had led to the high-priority escort vessel
program in the spring of 1943 had abated considerably, but was still
a matter of some concern to the planners. Moreover, despite the
acknowledged primacy of the European war, the Navy continued to
protect zealously the production and allocation of landing craft
destined for the Pacific. The Navy also could not easily forget the
unsettling effects that the 1942 landing craft program had had upon
its over-all
--400--
construction schedules.14
Not until the Allied political
authorities had come to a resolute decision on strategy at the close
of 1943 could the strategic and logistical planners proceed with
full confidence that the cross-Channel assault would be carried out.
When all these statistics on the distribution of U.S. manpower
and resources are considered, some of the implications of engaging
in a multi-front conflict become more obvious. It is apparent that a
mere decision at the top levels labeling one war primary and the
other secondary was not sufficient. The events of 1942 and 1943
demonstrated that a policy of opportunism on the fronts in both wars
tended to annul any paper priorities and led to' diversions usually
unfavorable to projected long-range deployment schemes such as
BOLERO. Limited and secondary offensives, covered by such catch
phrases as "maintaining the strategic initiative" and "applying
unremitting pressure," continued to absorb more men and resources
than originally planned, frequently at the expense of long-range
build-ups. The planners had found that it was impossible to keep a
secondary war secondary as long as there was no definite and
accepted long-range plan for the primary war. The tendency to expand
subordinate operations in the absence of over-all decisions
assigning top priority to the main effort was difficult to resist.
In addition, after two years of American participation in the war
the United States had acquired a number of "fixed charges" that were
accorded preferential treatment in the allocation of U.S.
resources--the so-called basic understandings, which consisted, to a
large degree, of maintaining America's allies. To the diversions of
the secondary fronts were added such charges as provision for the
security of the Western Hemisphere and the British Isles,
fulfillment of the Soviet protocols, and aid to China, France, and
Italy. It was not until OVERLORD was granted
top priority at SEXTANT
that it could compete with these other basic undertakings for
American resources. The double war could finally begin to assume the
focus and to flow in the channels planned by the War Department in
the early stages of coalition warfare.
--401--
Table of Contents
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Footnotes
1.
See chs. VIII and
XI, above.
2.
Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940-43, Chs.
XXV and
XXVI.
3.
Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley, Organization of Ground Combat Troops,
pp. 220-21.
4.
Ibid.,
pp. 231-32.
5.
(1) STM-30, 1 Jan 48.
(2) Greenfield, Palmer and Wiley, Organization of Ground Combat Troops,
p. 203.
6.
STM-30, 1 Jan 48.
7.
All figures in this and in the following deployment sections are based
on STM-30, 1 Jan 48, and
USAF Statistical Digest, 1947,
unless otherwise noted.
8.
The air group figures for the United Kingdom and for the Mediterranean
were received from U.S. Air Force, Directorate of Statistical Services. No
breakdown for these two areas is given in the
USAF 1947 Statistical Digest.
9.
For the 1942 trend see Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning: 1941-42,
Ch. XVI.
10.
USAF Statistical Digest, 1947.
The Army Air Forces received over 70
percent of factory deliveries of transport aircraft during 1943; the Navy,
Great Britain, and the Soviet Union received the bulk of the remainder.
11.
Data originally compiled from Rpts of Vessels Operations, Analysis
Branch, Water Div, OCT, and reworked for Statistics, a volume to be
published in the series UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II.
12.
WSA Shipping Summary, Aug 45, P. 40
13.
(1) George E. Mowry, Landing Craft and the WPB
(Hist Rpts on War Administration: WPB Sp Study No. II)
(rev. ed., Washington, 1946), pp. 8. 21-23 30-31 33-34.
(2) Civilian Production Administration,
Industrial Mobilization for War, I, Program and Administration
(Washington, Government Printing Office, 1947), pp. 536, 607-08, 636.
14.
A detailed account of the landing craft program during the last half
of 1943, including attention to the Navy's role, may be found in Leighton
and Coakley,
Global Logistics and Strategy, 1943-45.
