Number 37838
SUPPLEMENT
to
The London GazetteOf TUESDAY, the 31st of DECEMBER, 1946
The Air Ministry, January, 1947.AIR OPERATIONS BY THE ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY AIR FORCE IN N.W. EUROPE FROM NOVEMBER 15, 1943 TO SEPTEMBER 30TH, 1944
The following despatch by the late Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory, K.C.B., D.S.O., Air Commander-in-Chief, Allied Expeditionary Air Force, was submitted to the Supreme Allied Commander in November, 1944.
On relinquishing my command of the Allied Expeditionary Air Force I have the honour to submit the following Despatch, covering its operations -under my command during the period from 15th November, 1943 to 30th September, 1944.
Since this Despatch covers the air support of the assault of Europe and the subsequent land operations, it necessarily includes reference to the strategical operations of the United States Eighth Air Force and the Royal Air Force Bomber Command in addition to the operations of these two Air Forces and the Royal Air Force Coastal Command directed to the tactical support of the assault.
As the period covered by the Despatch extends over ten and a half months of the most heavy and concentrated air war in the history of the world, I have not attempted to deal with the events on a day-to-day basis. Rather I have taken the tasks undertaken in the preliminary and preparatory phases and in the assault and post-assault phase and have attempted to show how these tasks were fulfilled, as well as briefly indicating what I feel are some of the outstanding features of these air operations.
PART I—COMMAND AND CONTROL
Formation of A.E.A.F.
By a Directive (reference COSSAC (43) 81) dated 16th November, 1943, issued by your Chief of Staff, I was informed that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had appointed me Air Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Expeditionary Air Force under yourself as the Supreme Allied Commander, and that I was was to exercise operation command of the British and American tactical air forces supporting the assault of Western Europe from the United Kingdom. I was also informed that a United States General would be appointed Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Allied Expeditionary Air Force. Major-General William O. Butler was the first General Officer to hold this post. He served in this capacity from 1st January, 1944, to 25th May 1944, and was succeeded by Major-General Hoyt S. Vandenberg who occupied the position until 8th August 1944. Major-General Ralph Royce then held this appointment until the disbandment of A.E.A.F. on 14th October 1944.
Forces available.
2. The forces under my command comprised the Royal Air Force Second Tactical Air Force, the United States Ninth Air Force and the forces of the Air Defence of Great Britain. The Royal Air Force Second Tactical Air Force and the formations of the Air Defences of Great Britain passed to my command on 15th November 1943; the United States Ninth Air Force passed to my operational command on 15th December, 1943, but was not released from its commitment to assist the United States Strategic Air Forces in "Pointblank" operations until 10th March 1944.
3. You will recall that a definition of the role of the strategic air forces was not covered in the original Directive to me, but was deferred to a later date. However, my plans were made on the assumption that I should be able to count on the full support of the strategic air forces when it was required.
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4. On 17th November, 1943, I issued a Directive to the Air Marshal Commanding, Royal Air Force Second Tactical Air Force and to the Commanding General, United States Ninth Air Force, in which I informed them of my appointment as Air Commander-in-Chief and of the respective dates on which their units came under my operational control. I further directed that these forces should proceed, without delay, to prepare for operations in support of two British and two American Field Armies in an assault on the Continent. I also issued a Directive to the Air Marshal Commanding, Air Defence of Great Britain, setting out the functions and organisation of the Air Defence of Great Britain, following on its conversion from Royal Air Force Fighter Command.
5. On 6th December, 1943, I issued a further Directive to the forces under my command, outlining the "Overlord" plan and denning the control that I would exercise as Air Commander-in-Chief. A table showing these forces and the chain of command is at Appendix "A" (not reproduced).
Operation "Pointblank"
6. During the preliminary period of preparation for the assault, in late 1943 and early 1944, the medium and light 'bomber forces of the Allied Expeditionary Air Force continued to lend support to Operation "Pointblank." This was the name given to the combined bomber plan of the strategical bombing forces which had as its aims, first, the reduction of the fighter forces of the G.A.F., second, the general reduction in the war potential of Germany, and third, the weakening of the will of the German people to continue the struggle. The co-ordination of these operations was effected through a Combined Operational Planning Committee, which was a joint British/American Fighter and Bomber Committee responsible for planning daylight operations when the United States Army Air Force heavy bombers took part. During this preliminary period, the operations by Allied Expeditionary Air Force medium and light bombers in conjunction with, and in support of United States Eighth Air Force were given precedence over any other daylight operations. A second Committee, known as the 11 Group Planning Committee, coordinated operations of the medium and light bombers of the Allied Expeditionary Air Force other than those in the support role mentioned above. The activities of the fighter forces of the Allied Expeditionary Air Force as escort to, and in support of, bombing operations were also coordinated through these Committees.
Ninth Air Force Released from " Pointblank " Commitments
7. On 10th March, 1944, I forwarded a Directive to Commanding General, United States Ninth Air Force, advising him that you, as the Supreme Allied Commander, had decided that the time had come for the operations of the Ninth Air Force to be directed towards the preparation for Operation "Overlord" and that it would, therefore, operate exclusively under the Allied Expeditionary Air Force and be released from the commitment to assist the United States Eighth Air" Force in "Pointblank" operations. As an exception to this ruling, such fighters of the United States Ninth Fighter Command as were suitable and available continued to operate as escort to the United States Eighth Air Force when required.
8. At this time also, I advised the forces under my command that the most important assistance the Allied Expeditionary Air Force could give the Army during the preparatory phase would be by attacking the enemy's rail communications, with the object of so disorganising his railway system that he would find it difficult to supply his divisions in Northern France when the righting started and still more difficult to bring .reinforcements into the lodgment area. Selected rail centres were, therefore, put in the first priority for attack.
Role of Strategic Air Forces
9. Until March, 1944, strategic air forces comprising the United States Eighth Air Force and Royal Air Force Bomber Command, continued to be employed on Operation " Pointblank " under the direction of the British Chief of Air Staff acting as a representative of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. In March, 1944, as the completion of the. preparatory tasks for Operation "Overlord" became more urgent, the Combined Chiefs of Staff 'directed that " Overlord " should have priority over " Pointblank " and that the direction of strategic air forces should pass from the British Chief of Air Staff to yourself as the Supreme Allied Commander, on 14th April, 1944.
10. You instructed your deputy, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur W. Tedder, G.C.B., to exercise for you general supervision of all air forces, particularly in the co-ordination of the efforts of heavy bomber forces to be employed on operations " Pointblank" and " Overlord ". I was responsible to you for all air operations in connection with the latter plan and I accordingly passed to Air Chief Marshal Tedder my requirements for heavy bomber effort both in the preparatory and assault phases. During May, 1944, the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander decided that all air operations could be more easily planned and laid on at a single headquarters, and the Air Operations Planning Staff of Supreme Headquarters was moved to my Headquarters. The Deputy Supreme Allied Commander and the Commanders of the strategical and tactical air forces then regularly attended my daily conferences at Stanmore, thus enabling all operation orders covering all air forces occupied with " Overlord " tasks, to be coordinated and given rapidly to the forces to be employed.
Formation of Advanced A.E.A.F.
11. In order to achieve the most economical and effective employment of the air forces at my disposal for the assault and its subsequent development, I considered it essential that the air operations in immediate and direct support of the land battle should be specially coordinated and directed. I, therefore, decided to establish a small operational organisation to be known as Advanced Allied Expeditionary Air Force. Under my general direction, the Commander Advanced A.E.A.F. was given the task of directing and coordinating the planning for and operations of such forces of the United States Ninth Air Force and Royal Air Force Second Tactical Air Force as were allotted to him from time to time.
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12. Air Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham, K.C.B., D.S.O., M.C., D.F.C., A.F.C., was appointed Commander, Advanced Allied Expeditionary Air Force, and he undertook this responsibility on detachment from the Second Tactical Air Force. The Commander, Advanced A.E.A.F. was the one air commander with whom the Commander-in-Chief, 21st Army Group dealt in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief, Land Forces, during the initial phases of the operation. The Commander, Advanced A.E.A.F. had the necessary authority to implement the requests for air action made by the Army, referring to me any requests for air support beyond the resources of the two tactical air forces. Headquarters, Advanced A.E.A.F. was set up at Uxbridge on 1st May, 1944. Its War Room, where meetings to coordinate operations of the tactical air forces were held daily, was adjacent to the Combined Operations Room and the Combined Control and Reconnaissance Centres referred to below.
Machinery of Control of Tactical Air Forces
13. Throughout the preparatory and assault periods, the control of the fighter bombers and the light and medium bombers of the two tactical air forces was exercised (through a Combined Operations Room located at Uxbridge. This Operations Room was staffed by representatives of the United States Ninth Air Force and the Royal Air Force Second Tactical Air Force. Also under the direction of the Commander, Advanced A.E.A.F., a Combined Control Centre was set up and operated by the Air Officer Commanding No. 11 Group, Royal Air Force, with the full collaboration of the Commanding General, United States IXth Fighter Command and with authoritative representation of the United States Army VIIIth Fighter Command. This Combined Control Centre was manned by a British/ American staff and was, in effect, the Operations Room of No. 11 Group, Air Defence of Great Britain, with the complete static signals system.of the old organisation developed over a long period and augmented by additional communication facilities. This Centre planned, coordinated and controlled all fighter operations in the initial phases of the operations; it was also responsible for issuing executive instructions for the fighter bombers.
14. A Combined Reconnaissance Centre was also operated under the command of the Commander, Advanced A.E.A.F. to co-ordinate and direct the visual and photographic reconnaissance efforts of both the British and United States reconnaissance forces, during the initial phases.
15. At Appendix " B "* is a diagram, setting out the chain of control and the locations of various Headquarters at the time of the Assault. Modifications in this chain of control were made later as they became necessary. Headquarters, Royal Air Force Second Tactical Air Force and Headquarters, United States Ninth Air Force moved overseas on 4th August, 1944, and Headquarters, Advanced A.E.A.F. moved to the Continent on 9th August, 1944; to economise in communications, this Headquarters was located alongside Headquarters, United States Ninth Air Force. It continued in the field alongside this latter Headquarters (which was located next to 12th United States Army Group), in the advance from the Cotentin Peninsula to the Paris area, where it was located at Versailles. Main Headquarters, A.E.A.F. moved from Stanmore to the Continent on 8th September, 1944, and was located alongside your own Headquarters at Julouville. Communications at that place were quite inadequate to meet the needs of a headquarters of the size concerned, and Main Headquarters A.E.A.F. moved with Supreme Headquarters to Versailles on 19th September, 1944.
16. Plans 'had been drawn up for the further move of Advanced Headquarters, A.E.A.F. with Advanced Headquarters Ninth Air Force to Verdun. In view of impending developments, chiefly the absorption of A.E.A.F. into S.H.A.E.F., these plans were not put into operation. Headquarters, Advanced A.E.A.F. was therefore merged into Headquarters Main A.E.A.F. at 1200 hours on 23rd September, 1944.
PART II.—POLICY AND PLANNING.
(a) Operations prior to D-Day. Operation " Overlord, ".
17. Operation " Overlord " was part of a large strategic plan designed to bring about the defeat of Germany by heavy and concerted assaults on German-occupied Europe from the United Kingdom, the Mediterranean and Russia. A Joint Study and Outline Plan for Operation " Overlord " was completed in July, 1943. This plan was elaborated in more detail under the title " Neptune "—Initial Joint Plan and Maintenance Project/Administrative Plan—by the Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief, the Commander-in-Chief, 21st Army Group and myself. Operation " Neptune " provided for the launching of an assault from the United Kingdom across the English Channel, designed to secure a lodgment area on the Continent, from which wider offensive operations could be developed.
18. To cover the operations of all air forces allotted to Operation " Neptune ", an Overall Air Plan was evolved, which set out briefly the Joint Plan, the command and control of air forces involved, the principal air tasks and their development through the preliminary and preparatory phases, the assault and follow-up, and air operations subsequent to the assault and securing of the lodgment area. The main features of the Overall Air Plan are more fully dealt with in paragraphs 25 and 26 below.
19. To supplement the Initial Joint Plan for Operation " Neptune ", joint instructions and memoranda were issued by the Commanders-in-Chief of the Naval, Army and Air Forces. Administrative and Signals Planning.
20. To supplement the Overall Air Plan, additional Operational and Administrative Instructions were prepared and issued. In particular, comprehensive Administrative plans were issued for the Royal Air Force formations in A.E.A.F. and the United States Ninth Air Force. These Administrative plans, which were issued separately, were based on three previously agreed fundamental decisions:—
(a) The relative administrative responsibilities of the Army and Air Forces in the field. The division laid down was closely followed and, in practice, worked excellently.
* Appendices not reproduced.
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(b) Since the United States Army Air Force and the Royal Air Force respectively depended on separate administrative systems, no attempt to combine them should be made, except where advantage was clearly to be gained.
(c) The main base was to be the United Kingdom, and the principal administrative units were not to be moved to the Continent until it was clearly advantageous to do so.
21. These Administrative Plans were supplemented from time to time by additional Administrative Instructions issued by my Headquarters.
22. The completeness of these administrative plans and the accuracy of forecasting which was used enabled the air forces involved to fulfil all of the commitments laid upon them, and in the midst of their heaviest operations, to move across the Channel without any diminution of their effectiveness. This, I feel, constitutes a major triumph of organisation. Some details of the problems involved and overcome in this planning and administration are given in Part IV of this Despatch.
23. A comprehensive Signal Plan for Operation " Neptune " was also issued by my Headquarters. This plan was implemented with success on the whole. I deal with certain features of Signals Communications in Part IV of this Despatch.
24. To supplement the Overall Air Plan as necessary, Air Staff Policy and Operational Instructions were also issued by my Headquarters. Operational Memoranda and Administrative Memoranda were additionally issued by your Headquarters in cases where two or more of the Services were affected.
Overall Air Plan.
25. In the Overall Air Plan I set out the undermentioned principal air tasks for the forces under my command and for the allotted effort of the strategical air forces and Royal Air Force Coastal Command. These tasks were decided upon after discussions with yourself and the respective Commanders-in-Chief as to the requirements of the Army and the Navy from the air forces.
(a) To attain and maintain an air situation whereby the German Air Force was rendered incapable of effective interference with Allied operations.
(b) To provide continuous reconnaissance of the enemy's dispositions and movements.
(c) To disrupt enemy communications and channels of reinforcement and supply.
(d) To support the landing and subsequent advances of the Allied armies.
(e) To deliver offensive strikes against enemy naval forces.
(f) To provide air lift for airborne forces.
26. The co-ordination of the Air Plans with those of the other services was achieved by weekly meetings between the other Commanders-in-Chief and myself, together with our respective Chiefs of Staff and Chief Planners. These meetings, held alternately in the office of the planning centre of each of the three Services, ensured that each service was kept informed of the relative development of planning.
Objects of Preparatory Bombing.
27. I considered that the primary objective of preparatory bombing should be to impose the greatest possible delay in the movement of the enemy reinforcements and supplies, and to this end, the railway bombing plan was designed. The object of this plan was to produce a lasting and general dislocation of the railway system in use by the enemy. By so doing the capacity of the system as a whole would be greatly reduced, and the task of dealing with isolated movement once the battle was joined would be made all the easier. Accordingly, the primary targets planned for attack were the railway centres where the most important servicing and repair facilities of Northern France and the Low Countries were located; the secondary targets were the principal marshalling yards, particularly those which possessed repair facilities. The selection of targets was made difficult in some cases by the necessity of avoiding heavy civilian casualties or damage to historic buildings. Where railway centres were situated in thickly populated areas (as at Le Bourget, for example), alternative centres were chosen in order to isolate them. A further limitation was imposed by the necessity to pinpoint the attacks on these targets; this demanded visual bombing conditions for day attacks and clear weather during moon periods for night attacks. The possibility of unreliable weather, particularly round about D-Day, was one of the major factors which dictated an early commencement of this plan; in fact the weather did seriously hamper its execution. The development of the railway plan and some indication of its success are set out in Part III of this Despatch.
28. Complementary to the railway plan, a further plan was made, covering the destruction of road and rail bridges. This plan which called for the cutting of the Seine bridges below Paris and the bridges over the Loire below Orleans was put into operation at D — 30.
29. In the formulation and adoption of these plans to cause the maximum overall interference with enemy movements, it was fully appreciated, that the more successful were our attacks, the more embarrassing it would be to the Allied Armies when they came to move through the same area. This disadvantage though serious, was felt by the planners to be outweighed by the advantage of preventing the enemy from bringing in to the assault area sufficient reinforcements to contain the Allied bridgehead. I have dealt with this subject further in the section dealing with post-assault operations in Part III of this Despatch.
30. Other preparatory bombing plans included attacks on coastal batteries,-enemy naval and military targets and the .Radar chain. It was necessary to remember when making these plans that the enemy should not be given any indication of the area selected for the assault. The principal effect of this on the preparatory air operations was that at least two attacks were made on each type of target outside of the projected assault area to one attack on a target within that area.
Estimation of G.A.F. Capabilities.
31. I was confident that the German Air Force would constitute no serious threat to our operations on land, sea or in the air. However, I could not dismiss the possibility that the enemy was conserving his air forces for a
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maximum effort against the Allied assault forces. A bombing plan was therefore prepared which aimed at driving the G.A.F. fighters on to bases as far from the battle as were the Allied fighter forces, by destroying its bases within 130 miles radius of the assault area. Enemy bomber bases even further inland were also scheduled for attack.
32. Moreover, as I considered it possible that an intense air battle might last for anything up to a week following the launching of the assault, it was necessary to have on hand a strong enough force of fighter aircraft to ensure that the enemy would be completely mastered in any such battle. I refer to the constitution and use of this fighter force in Part III of this Despatch.
"Crossbow " Operations.
33. Throughout the whole of the preliminary and preparatory phases of the operation, I had to take into account the need to maintain a sufficient weight of bombing attacks on " Noball " targets. " Noball " was the code word used to designate the sites being prepared by the enemy for attacks on the United Kingdom with flying bombs and rockets. The operations against these sites carried out under the title of " Crossbow '' had begun as early as 5th December, 1943, and constituted a considerable diversion of bomber effort. This bombing, while it did not, of itself, succeed in completely eliminating the menace of the flying bomb, was fully justified, in view of the fact that the original scheme had to be abandoned by the Germans. Details of the effort involved and an indication of the results achieved are given in Part III of this Despatch.
34. The diversion of bombing effort on to " Noball " targets, however, was not wholly unprofitable, even if judged from the point of view of " Neptune " alone. The medium and light bomber crews gained invaluable experience in finding and attacking small and well concealed targets and inevitably improved their standard of bombing accuracy. Moreover, much of the flying in these winter and spring months was carried out in very bad weather conditions. Again the crews gained invaluable experience in instrument flying through bad weather. These were all gains that were to stand us in good stead later in the battle.
(b) Operations during the Assault
35. My plan for the use of air power in direct support of the assault called for the fulfilment of the following principal air tasks: —
(a) To protect the cross-channel movement of the assault forces against enemy air attack, and to assist the Allied naval forces to protect the assault craft and shipping from enemy naval forces.
(b) To prepare the way for the assault by neutralising the coast and beach defences.
(c) To protect the landing beaches and the shipping concentrations from enemy air attack.
(d) To dislocate enemy communications and control during the assault. To accomplish these tasks, detailed plans were produced and a record of the manner in which these plans were put into operation appears in Part III of this Despatch.
(c) Operations Subsequent to D-Day.
36. The planning of air operations during the post-assault phase of the battle was along two lines. The first part included the continuation and expansion of attacks designed to interfere with the movements of enemy supplies and reinforcements, in addition to other detailed plans covering the operations of the heavy bomber forces in close support. These plans were produced at my main headquarters. The second part of post-assault planning covered the changing needs of the ground situation and this day-by-day planning was coordinated and controlled through the headquarters of Advanced A.E.A.F.
37. In the foregoing paragraphs I have set out briefly the main principles which guided the planning of air operations before, during and after the assault. A general picture of these air operations as planned is given in the attached map.* More detailed descriptions of the individual plans evolved to implement these principles will be found in Part III where such descriptions fit in more logically. In the final part of this Despatch I have included some considerations governing our general planning.
38. I should like to emphasise that my Planning Staff, like my Operations Staff, was Allied in the true sense of the word, and that both the American and British components worked together most successfully under the direction of my Senior Air Staff Officer, Air Vice Marshal H. E. P. Wigglesworth, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.C.
PART III—NARRATIVE OF OPERATIONS.
(a) Preliminary Period. Air Superiority essential.
39. Air superiority was the principal prerequisite for the successful assault of Europe from the West. The winning of air superiority was therefore the cardinal point of air planning. Air operations to ensure that the requisite degree of air superiority had been gained by D-Day were begun in the preliminary phase and continued during the preparatory phase. On D-Day itself a series of concentrated attacks, was made on the G.A.F. airfields in the pre-selected area; but as a result of the earlier operations, I was confident that the necessary degree of air ascendancy had been gained sometime before D-Day and advised yourself, the Allied Commanders and the Chiefs of Staff to this effect. In the event, the German Air Force was more impotent than I expected.
40. I have set out in the following paragraphs some of the efforts of the strategical bomber forces directed to securing air superiority during the preliminary period. The medium and light bomber forces of the A.E.A.F. were throughout this period engaged in support of the strategical bomber programme and in meeting the commitment for attacks on flying bomb and rocket sites.
41. The long-term strategic bombing plan directed against enemy centres of production and assembly of aircraft and aircraft components, principally by the United States Eighth Air Force and also by Royal Air Force Bomber Command, and the United States Fifteenth Air Force operating from the Mediterranean, inflicted crippling blows on the supply and maintenance organisation of the German Air Force.
* Maps not reproduced.
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Moreover, the heavy daylight raids of the United States Eighth Air Force into Germany achieved a steady attrition of the German fighter forces.
Attrition of the G.A.F
42. How crippling these blows were on German aircraft production is illustrated by information obtained from intelligence sources. A comprehensive picture of the effects of direct air attack in terms of enemy single-engine fighter production during the five months from 1st November, 1943 to 1st April, 1944 can be gained from the estimates below: —*
Planned Achieved November 1,280 600 December 1,335 600 January 1,415 650 February 1,480 600 March 1,555 500
7,065 2,950 43. The difference between the production planned and achieved totals 4,115 aircraft, an average loss to .the enemy of more than 820 single-engined fighters per month.
44. These figures ignore the heavy losses sustained by German Air Force fighters in air attacks on their airfields and in combat; also the effective attacks on the factories producing twin-engined fighters must be taken into account.
45. Parallel with the attacks on production centres by the strategic air forces, a campaign of day and night intruding against enemy airfields, designed to hamper enemy training schedules as well as to destroy the enemy in the air, was carried out by aircraft of A.E.A.F. with very great success. In addition, many heavy attacks were made in the preliminary period on the enemy's airfields, which achieved considerable destruction of airfield facilities.
46. It became evident during this period (November, 1943, to May, 1944) that the High Command of the German Air Force was pursuing a policy of conserving its air forces for the defence of vital targets only. This policy made it extremely difficult to get the G.A.F to fight. Even large scale fighter sweeps failed to produce any serious reaction. However, in the period from 15th November, 1943, the date of the formation of A.E.A.F., to the 5th June, 1944, the eve of D-day , the Allied forces accounted for the following enemy aircraft in air combat alone.
47. This enormous attrition of G.A.F. strength is based on claims of enemy aircraft destroyed in combat alone; no account is taken in these statistics of aircraft destroyed on the ground. Of the figures given above no less than 2,665 enemy aircraft were destroyed by Allied Air Forces operating out of the United Kingdom during what I have termed the preparatory period of the assault, namely 1st April to 5th June, 1944. I deal with the planned attacks on the G.A.F. and its bases in France during this preparatory period in para. 129 et seq.
(b) Preparatory Period.
Method of Presentation.
48. Since the war began all attacks against enemy targets have, in some measure influenced the situation prevailing on the eve of the assault. The commencement of the preparatory phase for this Despatch I have, however, fixed at 1st April 1944, except in so far as detailed coordinated plans for attack on targets of specific importance within the framework of the "Neptune" plan were in operation earlier. In these cases, I have included all the attacks made in accordance with the complete plan.
49. For convenience of presentation, I have dealt with these preparatory operations under the headings set out below. These headings cover the various operations planned and carried out to fulfil the tasks laid on to the air forces (see paragraph 25):—
Dislocation of Enemy Lines of Communication, including Destruction of Bridges.
Neutralisation of Coastal Defences.
Disruption of Enemy Radar Cover and W/T facilities.
Attacks on Military facilities.
Harassing of Coastwise Shipping and Sea Mining.
Attacks on Airfields.
Air Reconnaissance.
Protection of the Assembling Assault Forces.
"Crossbow" Operations.
* Subject to modification in the light of information subsequently received.
Destroyed Probably Destroyed Damaged A.E.A.F.
711 79 308
Aircraft on offensive operations
167 23 39
Aircraft on defensive operations over the United Kingdom and Channel areas
878 102 347 Guns of Anti-Aircraft Command
73 5 22 Eighth Air Force—by Bombers 2,223 696 1,188 —by Fighters 1,835 202 705 R.A.F. Bomber Command
201 52 267 R.A.F. Coastal Command
28 3 22 Grand Totals 5,238 1,060 2,551
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Strength of A.E.A.F. at 1st April, 1944.
50. Details of the composition of the forces at my disposal at 1st April, 1944, are given at Appendix "C".* The number of operationally available aircraft on hand at that date in these Commands was as follows:—
Dislocation of Enemy Lines of Communication.
Type Ninth Air Force Royal Air Force Medium Bombers 496 70 Light Bombers 96 38 Fighter and Fighter Bombers 607 1,764 Transport Aircraft 865 225 Gliders 782 351 Reconnaissance Aircraft 63 156 Artillery Observation Aircraft — 164 2,909 2,768
51. Next to the winning of air superiority, the dislocation of the enemy's lines of communication was the most important task set the Air Force (see paragraph 27). The basic intention of my plan for attack on the enemy lines of communication was to force the enemy off the railways, initially within an area of 150 miles from the battle front. There were two broad plans for doing this; one was a short term policy which involved attacks on certain rail centres during the period immediately before D-Day; the other was a longer term plan of destroying the potential of the railway system in North-Western Europe.
52. The short term policy involved attacks on 17 specially selected rail focal points, plus an extra 7 points as cover. It was claimed for this plan that if the attacks were made immediately before D-Day, the enemy's reinforcements by rail would be adequately delayed. Further, it would allow the bomber forces to continue attacks on "Pointblank" and other strategic targets until just before D-Day. Complete success would, of course, have been necessary, with all the 17 primary targets to achieve the desired result; moreover, several of the targets chosen were unsuitable for air attack, either by virtue of their location or their nature as bombing targets. Other disadvantages of this plan were that any failure to achieve complete success on the primary targets would have meant that the enemy could direct traffic through .such gaps as would be left; the attacks would have to be made at a time when other demands on the available bomber forces were strongest; the successful outcome of a programme covering such a short period would depend entirely upon favourable bombing weather conditions—such conditions could never be guaranteed even in the summer.
53. The longer term plan involved attacks on a large number of repair and maintenance centres designed to reduce the movement potential and the motive power of the railway system, supported by complementary action in cutting railway lines and bridges on the canalized routes nearer D-Day. There were, however, limitations to this longer term plan. It would take longer to implement and would involve a greater diversion of the total effort of the bomber forces. If successful, it would hamper the Allies as effectively as it did the enemy, when the Allies came to move over the same territory. It was, however, a much more certain way of achieving the primary object stated above in paragraph 51, and was less dependent upon a period of good weather near D-Day.
54. In March, 1944, in consultation with the British Chief of Air Staff, Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Charles Portal, G.C.B., D.S.O., M.C., the Commanders of the Strategical Air Forces and the representatives of the land forces, you accepted the longer term plan, and the targets selected for attack were allocated to the respective forces (see paragraph 57).
55. Later, the initial plan was amplified and the area selected for attack was greatly expanded. In fact, finally it had little limitation.
56. Attacks by heavy and medium bombers on railway centres were maintained up to and after D-Day. From D-7 they were supplemented by attacks designed to cut the lines and halt or destroy such traffic as could still be moved. In these tasks, fighter bombers played the major part, although the medium and heavy bombers also cooperated. The principal targets in these attacks were bridges, junctions, cross-overs and tunnels, as well as locomotives and rolling stock. I deal with these attacks in paragraph 74 onwards; but in view of special features involved in the attacks on bridges, I deal with those attacks separately, for the sake of clarity, hi paragraph 83 onwards.
57. Allocation of Targets. A total of eighty rail targets of primary importance were scheduled for attack by A.E.A.F., Royal Air Force Bomber Command and the United States Eighth Air Force. These targets were finally allocated as follows: —
A.E.A.F. 18 R.A.F. Bomber Command 39 U.S. Eight Air Force 23 58. In addition to these targets, the United States Fifteenth Air Force were allocated fourteen targets in Southern France and nine targets in Germany. However, this Command did not operate against these targets in Southern France until 25th May, 1944 and then only for three days. The targets allocated to them in Germany were not attacked.
59. A number of railway centres not included in the Directive were also lightly attacked, but I have not included these in the general survey of results which follows.
60. By D-Day, of the eighty targets allocated, fifty-one were categorised as being damaged to such an extent that no further attacks were necessary until vital repairs had been effected; twenty-five were categorised as having been very severely damaged, but with certain vital installations still intact, necessitating a further attack; the remaining four were categorised as having received little or no damage, and needing a further attack on first priority.
* Appendices not reproduced.
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61. The proportion of successes in this respect was as follows:—
Force Cat "A" Cat "B" Cat "C" A.E.A.F. 14 2 2 R.A.F. Bomber Command 22 15 2 U.S. Eighth Air Force 15 8 — 62. In the period of the operation of this rail selected targets and dropped a total weight of plan, i.e., 9th February to D-Day, a total of 21,949 aircraft operated against the eighty selected targets and dropped a total weight of 66,517 tons of bombs. The scale of effort was as follows:—
Force Sorties Bombs A.E.A.F. 8,736 10,125 tons R.A.F. Bomber Command 8,751 44,744 tons U.S. Eighth Air Force 4,462 11,648 tons 21,949 66,517 tons 63. In the attacks made by the United States Fifteenth Air Force on 25th May, 1944, and the subsequent two days, 1,600 sorties' were flown against 14 targets and 3,074 tons of bombs were dropped. Of these 14 targets allocated in Southern France, at D-Day five were Category " A ", one was Category " B " and eight were Category " C ". '
64. The first of the really heavy and damaging attacks on rail centres was that made by Royal Air Force Bomber Command on Trappes on the night of 6th-7th March, 1944.
65. An immediate interpretation of photographs taken after this attack showed extremely heavy damage throughout the yards, the greatest concentration of craters being in the "Up" reception sidings. 190 direct hits were scored on tracks, as many as three tracks having, in several cases, been disrupted by one bomb. Numerous derailments and much wreckage were caused by 50 bombs which fell among the lines of rolling stock with which the yard was crowded. All the tracks of the main electrified line between Paris and Chartres which passes through this yard were cut, several of the overhead standards having been hit, and at the east end of the yard, at least five direct hits were scored on the constriction of lines. To the northeast of the target, the engine shed was two-thirds destroyed.
66. Of the other early attacks carried out in March and early April, some of the most successful were those on Paris/La Chappelle, Charleroi/St. Martin, Paris/Juvisy, Laon and Aachen, at each of these centres the locomotive servicing and maintenance facilities were rendered almost, if not completely, useless and great havoc was wrought in the marshalling yards. At Paris/Noisy le Sec, the whole railway complex was almost annihilated. Other damaging attacks in this early period were made on Ottignies, Rouen, Namur, Lens and Tergnier. Nine of these 11 attacks were carried out by R.A.F. Bomber Command.
67. From the first attacks, the enemy energetically set about endeavouring to make good the damage inflicted, but Trappes, first attacked by Bomber Command on 6th–7th March, 1944, was still under repair at the end of April.
68. For the effort involved, the results of the attack on Charleroi/St. Martin on 18th April, 1944, are worth citing, but this attack is only typical of many of these blows at the enemy communications. A force of 82 Marauders and 37 Bostons of the United States Ninth Air Force attacked the railway centre between 1835 and 1905 hours, dropping a total of 176 tons of bombs on the target. Photographic interpretation after this attack showed that the locomotive repair shop and two locomotive depots were very heavily damaged. The marshalling yard was ploughed up and all through traffic stopped. A single through track was later established on the north side of the yard and was completed by 2nd May, 1944, 14 days later. A double track through the marshalling yard was re-established by 11th May, 1944, but at D-Day (6th June), the marshalling yard was still unserviceable and the repair facilities could not be used.
69. During the last days of April and throughout the month of May, 1944, the same high degree of success achieved by the early attacks was maintained. A growing paralysis was being extended over the rail networks of the Region Nord, west of a line Paris–Amiens–Boulogne and South Belgium. In these areas, all the principal routes were, at one time or another, interrupted. Other centres to the east and south of Paris had also been attacked.
70. In the last week of April, Aulnoye, Villeneuve-St. Georges, Acheres, Montzen, St. Ghislain, Arras and Bethune were all attacked. During May, the heaviest attacks were made on Mantes/Gassicourt, Liege, Ghent, Courtrai, Lille, Hasselt, Louvain, Boulogne, Orleans, Tours, Le Mans, Metz, Mulhouse, Rheims, Troyes and Charleroi.
71. Photographic interpretation continued to show the devastating effect on the centres attacked, and other intelligence sources confirmed this evidence, as well as supplying indications of damage to signals and ancillary services, damage which did not appear in photographs.
72. In order to extend the paralysis inflicted on the regions north and west of Paris, attacks were made in the period immediately before D-Day, on the eastern routes to Paris and the important avoiding routes round the south of that city, and on centres on the Grande Ceinture. Attacks on these centres were considerably restricted by the necessity of avoiding causing heavy civilian casualties or damage to historic buildings. A typical example of this restriction was furnished by the important junction of Le Bourget which, because of the strong probability of bombing causing heavy civilian casualties, was not attacked at all.
73. At D-Day, I believed the primary object of the rail plan had been fully realised. The events which followed confirmed my belief. After the Allied advance, enquiry from the
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French railway authorities indicated very clearly that pre-D-Day attacks achieved the purpose intended. The Nazi controlled transport system was very badly disorganised. It had therefore, become extremely vulnerable to the attention of the medium and fighter bombers, which, in the periods just before and after the assault, caused great destruction to immobilised rolling stock.
74. Attacks on Locomotive Power.—Attack on repair depots and facilities was the main method of achieving the desired reduction in traction power. It was accepted that these attacks would, at the same time, damage and destroy locomotives. For example, in one such attack, about five per cent, of the locomotives in the Region Nord were put out of service. In addition, however, it was planned to attack directly trains and locomotives on open lines.
75. I.first initiated special large scale fighter sweeps against trains and locomotives in Northern France and Belgium on 21st May, 1944. On this day, concentrated efforts were made in certain areas in France, with some attention to connections from Germany and Belgium. Fighters of A.E.A.F. and the United States Eighth Air Force swept over railway tracks covering a very wide area and created havoc among locomotives, passenger trains, goods trains and oil wagons.
76. On this day, 21st May, 504 Thunderbolts, 233 Spitfires, 16 Typhoons and 10 Tempests of A.E.A.F. operated throughout the day, claiming 67 locomotives destroyed, 91 locomotives damaged and six locomotives stopped. Eleven other locomotives were attacked with unknown results and numerous trains were attacked and damage inflicted on trucks, carriages, oil wagons, etc.
77. On this same day, United States Eighth Air Force Fighter Command sent out 131 Lightnings, 135 Thunderbolts and 287 Mustangs against similar targets in Germany. They claimed 91 locomotives destroyed and 134 locomotives damaged. In addition, one locomotive tender, six goods wagons and three box cars were destroyed, whilst seven goods wagons, seven trains, three rail cars, four box cars and thirteen trucks were damaged, and sixteen trains set on fire.
78. From 22nd May to D-Day, A.E.A.F. flew 1,388 sorties with the primary purpose of attacking locomotives. In this period they claimed 157 locomotives destroyed and 82 damaged, as well as numerous trucks.
79. On 25th May, United States Eighth Air Force Fighter Command flew 608 sorties over France and Belgium, with the result that 41 locomotives, 1 troop train with approximately 300 men and 19 trucks were destroyed, and 25 locomotives and 50 trucks were damaged. Though outside the " Neptune " area, it is interesting to record that on 29th May, aircraft of Eighth Air Force Fighter Command flew 571 sorties over Eastern Germany and Poland, attacking 24 locomotives, 32 oil tank cars, 16 box cars and 3 freight trains with unobserved results. In addition to these special attacks, aircraft of Eighth Air Force Fighter Command frequently attacked locomotives and trains amongst other ground targets, when returning from escorting heavy bombers.
80. The total effort by fighters against rolling stock from 19th May to D-Day was as under:—
A.E.A.F. 2,201 sorties U.S. Eighth Air Force 1,731 sorties 3,932 sorties 81. With the capacity and flexibility of the enemy rail system destroyed, the enemy armies in the field were denied the freedom of movement necessary to mount decisive counterattacks. Further, the enemy armies and their supplies were forced on to the roads, thus not only slowing up their movement and making them more vulnerable to air attack, but also by compelling the enemy to use motor transport making him draw more heavily on his precious reserves of oil and rubber. Air attacks on these road movements eventually forced the enemy to move mainly by night.
82. During the assault and post-assault phases, this stranglehold on the enemy rail communications was effectively maintained. Details of the attacks involved and some evidence of the delay produced in the enemy build-up are given in Part III (c) of this Despatch.
83. Destruction of Bridges.—As I have already explained, complementary to the plan to destroy, by air attack, the enemy's rail motive power, I planned also to endeavour to destroy all the principal rail and road bridges leading into the assault area. If these were destroyed, not only would the enemy's rate of build-up in that area be further checked and his flow of reinforcements and supplies be further impeded, but also his ability to escape rapidly from the assault area in the event of his being forced to retreat would be very seriously impaired. The implications of the attacks on bridges were, therefore, somewhat wider than those of the other attacks on his communications system. In conjunction with these other attacks, the attacks on bridges were designed to seal off the assault area and so force the enemy to stand and fight, and since he could not easily retreat, any defeat would be decisive.
84. A bridge is, by nature of its size, very difficult to hit and, by nature of its construction, even more difficult to destroy completely. Calculation suggested that approximately 600 tons of bombs per bridge would be needed if the task were entrusted to heavy bombers. In fact, it was found that an average of 640 tons of bombs per bridge was needed. What was not at first realised was how effectively, and relatively cheaply, the task could be carried out by fighter bombers. It was learnt from the attacks on bridges by the aircraft of A.E.A.F. that a bridge could be destroyed for the expenditure of approximately 100 sorties, that is between 100 and 200 tons of bombs.
85. In order not to betray a special interest in tile " Neptune " area, attention was paid in the preparatory phase principally to the bridges over the Seine, with some others over the Oise, Meuse and the Albert Canal, leaving to the assault phase the task of attacking bridges south of Paris to Orleans and west along the Loire.
86. On 21st April, 1944, the first of a series of attacks against bridges was made by Typhoons. Subsequent attacks were carried
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out by formations of fighter bombers which included Thunderbolts, Typhoons and Spitfires and by the medium bombers of the United States Ninth Air Force. The early operations were of an experimental nature, the intention being to explore the possibilities of attacks by fighter bombers and medium bombers against this-type of target. The success of the early operations by fighter bombers surpassed expectations. It is probable that in one or two early attacks, a lucky hit exploded the demolition charges that had been set in place by the Germans and in such cases, the destruction caused was out of all proportion to the effort expended. Nevertheless, proof was speedily available that fighter bombers could carry out the task of destroying bridges effectively and relatively cheaply.
87. As D-Day approached, so the intensity of the attacks increased, until a crescendo of effort was achieved over a period of about 10 days prior to D-Day. These attacks were carried out, in the main, by fighter bombers and medium bombers of the United States Ninth Air Force, although Royal Air Force Second Tactical Air Force and the heavy bombers and fighter bombers of the United States Eighth Air Force also provided a contribution to the success of the plan. The marked success of the low level fighter bomber attacks of the Ninth Air Force, as well as the results obtained by the medium bombers is a tribute to the high standard of bombing accuracy developed by this force during the preparatory period. These attacks were often met by heavy anti-aircraft fire, and the resultant losses were not light.
88. The outcome of these attacks was that, on D-Day, twelve railway bridges and the same number of road bridges over the River Seine were rendered impassable. In addition, three railway bridges at Liege and others at Hasselt, Herenthals, Namur, Conflans (Pointe Eifel), Valenciennes, Hirson, Konz-Rarthaus and Tours, as well as the important highway bridge at Saumur, were also unserviceable.
89. After D-Day, the assault on bridges of tactical and strategical importance to the enemy was maintained and the results are confirmed in prisoner of war reports of the disruption and delay in the movement of troops and equipment which the enemy experienced. Details of these attacks are given in Part III (d) of this Despatch.
90. The statistical summary below is necessarily incomplete as, in many cases, road and rail bridges were attacked as targets of opportunity by fighter bombers of A.E.A.F. and the Eighth Air Force while engaged on offensive patrols against miscellaneous targets. In these instances, therefore, no separate appreciation of attacks on bridges, is possible.
91. Attacks on Road and Rail Bridges for period 21st April-6th June.
92. There can be no doubt that the enemy's transport difficulties after D-Day were the result of the cumulative and combined effects of all the attacks levelled against his communications system. The attacks on nodal points in the railway system, the complementary attacks on bridges and the line-cutting by fighter bombers, all contributed to the restriction placed upon enemy movements.
Neutralisation of Coastal Defences93. I now come to air operations directed to the support of the landing (see paragraph 25). These operations had to be begun well in advance of D-Day. It was essential, as far as possible, to destroy the enemy's capacity to prevent Allied shipping from approaching the assault area and to blind him to that approach. I deal below, therefore, with air operations during this preparatory period directed to the neutralisation of the enemy's coastal defences and the disruption of his Radar cover.
94. There were forty-nine known coastal batteries capable of firing on shipping approaching the assault area. Included in this number were some batteries still under construction. In the conditions that would obtain at the time of the assault, it would clearly be impossible for the naval forces successfully to engage all the coastal batteries. They, therefore, had to be dealt with before the landing and the air forces undertook this task at the request of the Naval and Army Commanders. I did not consider that aerial attacks against batteries whose casemates were completed were likely to be very effective. Fortunately those batteries in the Cherbourg area were the last to be casemated, and it was possible therefore, to attack many of them while they were still incomplete.
95. To avoid showing particular interest in the assault area, it was planned to attack batteries outside the assault area ranging as far north as Ostend, in the proportion of two outside to one within the area.
96. Interpretation reports revealed that, in a great many instances, the bombing was more successful than I at first expected; by D-Day, the majority of the coastal batteries within the area had been subjected to damaging attack.
* R.P=rocket projectile.
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97. Attacks on Coastal Batteries for period loth April-^th June. (a) Inside Assault Area Force A.E.A.F. U.S. Eighth Air Force R.A.F. Bomber Command Sorties 1,755 184 556 Force A.E.A.F U.S. Eighth Air Force R.A.F. Bomber Command Total for the period loth April to 5th June, 1944—8,765 sorties, 23,094 tons of bombs and 495 x 6o-lb. R.Ps. 98. Of these attacks, one of the most outstanding was that carried out by 64 Lancasters of R.A.F. Bomber Command, with 7 Mosquitoes acting as a Pathfinder Force. During this raid, on the night of 28th-2gth May, 356 2,495 % Outside Assault Area Sorties 3,244 1,499 6,270 Bombs 2,886-5 tons 495 x 6o-lb. R.Ps. 579-0 tons 2,438-5 tons 5,904 tons 495 x 6o-lb. R.Ps. Bombs 5,846 tons 4,559 tons 6,785 tons 17,190 tons tons of H.E. bombs were dropped on the coastal battery at St. Martin de Varreville, with excellent results. These results, reported by A.P.I.S. Medmenham, after a photographic reconnaissance sortie made on 29th May, were confirmed by a captured German report made by the troop commander of the battery. The two reports are given below for comparison. Photographic Reconnaissance Report. A heavy concentration of craters is seen in the target area with excellent results. Damage to Casemates: No. i. Five very near misses, all within 45 feet. Casemate walls damaged. No. 2. Damaged by at least five near misses. No. 3. Destroyed and no longer identifiable; six near misses. No. 4. Excavation undamaged. Damage to Command Post: Demolished by a direct hit and five near misses or probable hits. Damage to Accommodation • Personnel shelters in rear of each emplacement all indistinguishable amidst the craters. Captured German Report. The position is covered with craters . Several direct hits with very heavy bombs were made on No. 3 shelter (casemate) which apparently burst open and then collapsed. . . . . The rest of the shelters remain undamaged. . '. . the iron equipment hut which contained signals apparatus, the armoury, the gas chamber and artillery instruments received a direct hit, and only a few twisted iron girders remain. . . . the men's canteen received several direct hits and was completely destroyed. The messing huts, containing the battery dining room, the kitchen and clerks' office, were completely destroyed by near misses. A concrete-built hot shower bath was completely destroyed by a direct hit; as well as the nearby joiner's shop. 99. Effective attacks were also carried out by aircraft of R.A.F. Bomber Command against the six-gun battery at Morsalines, and by Marauders of the United States Ninth Air Force on the batteries at Houlgate, Ouistreham and Point de Hoe. 100. Out of forty sites allotted to A.E.A.F., thirty-seven were attacked, sixteen out of eighteen in the assault area and twenty-one out of twenty-two outside. Of these, nine in the area and fourteen outside received hits on one or more emplacements. Forty-eight sites were allotted to R.A.F. Bomber Command, fourteen of which were outside. Hits on essential elements were secured on five batteries in the area and nine outside. Of the fifty-two targets allotted to the United States Eighth Air Force, thirty-two of which were in the assault area, only six sites in the area and sixteen outside were attacked. Some of the batteries were allotted to two commands. 101. In addition to the targets listed in the plan, many other coastal defence targets in and out of the area were attacked as targets of opportunity. 102. During the hours of darkness preceding the actual assault, a tremendous air bombardment was directed on to the batteries which could not be destroyed within the assault area, aimed at neutralising them during the critical assault period. This the attacks succeeded in doing. Details of the effort employed are given in Part III (c) of this Despatch.
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Disruption of Enemy Radar Cover and WjT Facilities'. 103. The enemy Radar cover on the Western Front was complete from Norway to the Spanish border. This cover was obtained by a chain of coastal stations, each composed of a number of installations. The density of these stations was such that there was a major site, containing an average of three pieces of equipment, every ten miles between Ostend and Cherbourg. This coastal chain was backed by a somewhat less dense inland system and by numerous mobile installations. The attached map* shows the location of the principal enemy Radar sites and the coverage of this Radar Cham. 104. The scale and variety of equipment in this Radar organisation was such that completely to destroy the system by air attack alone would have been a formidable proposition. This, however, was not necessary—the destruction of certain vital Radars and the comprehensive jamming of others could so gravely interfere with the operation of the system as almost to make it useless. I therefore decided to attack Radar stations between Ostend and the Channel Islands in accordance with the following principles: — (a) Radar installations which could not be jammed electronically, or were difficult to jam, should be destroyed: (6) Radar installations capable of giving good readings on ships and of controlling coastal guns should be destroyed: (c) Radar installations likely to assist the enemy in inflicting casualties to airborne forces should be destroyed: (d) Two -targets outside the assault area were to be attacked for every one attacked in the area. The attacks had a dual purpose. They aided both current air operations and naval operations in the Channel, and they prepared for the assault by blinding the enemy. 105. On loth May, 1944, a series of attacks was begun against the long range aircraft reporting stations, and on i8th May, on the installations used for night fighter control and the control of coastal guns. On 25th May, 42 sites were scheduled for attack. These sites included 106 installations; at D-3, fourteen of these sites were confirmed destroyed. 106. To conserve effort, I then decided, three days before D-Day, to restrict attacks to the twelve most important sites; six were chosen by the naval authorities and six by the air authorities. These twelve sites, containing thirty-nine installations, were all attacked in the three days prior to D-Day. 107. Up to D-Day, 1,668 sorties were flown by aircraft of A.E.A.F. in attacks on Radar installations. Typhoons in low level attacks flew 694 sorties and fired 4,517 x 6o-lb. R.Ps. Typhoons and Spitfires made 759 divebombing sorties, dropping 1,258 x 50o-lb. bombs and light and medium bombers dropped 217 tons of bombs. In addition, the sites and equipment were attacked with many thousands of rounds of cannon and machine-gun fire. 108. These Radar targets were very heavily defended by flak and low level attacks upon them demanded great skill and daring. Pilots * Maps not reproduced. of the R.A.F. Second Tactical Air Force were mainly employed and losses among senior and more experienced pilots were heavy. There is no doubt, however, that these attacks saved the lives of countless soldiers, sailors and airmen on D-Day. The following details of some of the. successful attacks made during the last three days before the assault, show the outstanding results obtained by Typhoon and Spitfire pilots in low level attacks pressed home to very close range. (a) Cap de la Hague/Jobourg. This site was attacked by rocket firing Typhoons of 174, 175 and 245 Squadrons, Second Tactical Air Force, on 5th June, and 200 x 6o-lb. R.Ps. were fired. The " Hoarding ", an installation used for long range aircraft reporting, was destroyed. Three of the attacking aircraft were destroyed by flak. (b) Dieppe /Caudecote. This site was attacked by 18 R.P. Typhoons of 198 and 609 Squadrons, Second Tactical Air Force, on 2nd June. 104 x 6o-lb. R.Ps. were fired, with the result that the " Hoarding " was destroyed and the " Freya" and " Wuerzlburg " installations, used for medium range aircraft reporting, night fighter control and control of coastal guns, were damaged. One of the Typhoons was destroyed by flak. (c) 'Cap d'Antifer. This station was attacked several times. On 4th June, 23 Spitfires of 441, 442 and 443 Squadrons, Second Tactical Air Force, dive-bombed • with 23 x 5oo-lb. M.C. instantaneous bombs; nine direct hits were scored. The " Chimney " and one " Giant Wuerzburg " were destroyed, and other installations damaged. 109. In addition to the attacks on the enemy Radar stations, attacks were also made on the most important of his navigational beam stations and on certain special W/T stations. no. Navigational Stations. There were two enemy radio navigational stations important to the assault area, one'at Sortosville, south of Cherbourg, and the other at Lanmeur, near Morlaix. Both of these stations were attacked, the first target being destroyed and the second rendered unserviceable, at least temporarily. in. W/T Stations. Four W/T stations of the highest importance were subjected to attack by R.A.F. Bomber Command. These attacks were triumphs of precision bombing and completely achieved their object. Details of these attacks are given below. (a) Boulogne/Mt. Couple. This large installation contained about 60 transmitters. The first attack was unsuccessful, but two nights later, 3ist May/ist June, in an attack by 105 heavy bombers dropping 530 tons of bombs, at least 70 heavy bombs were placed on the target, which is some 300 yards long and 150 yards wide. Only a negligible fraction of the transmitters on this site survived the attacks, a maximum of three being subsequently identified in operation. (&) Beaumont Hague/ Au Fewre. This installation was attacked on the night of 3ist May/ist June by 121 aircraft; 498 tons of bombs were dropped and good results were obtained. The main concentration of bombs
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fell just outside the target area, but a number scored direct hits. The station was rendered completely unserviceable. (c) Dieppe JBernaval le Grand. The attack on this station on the night of 2nd/ 3rd June was completely successful. 104 aircraft dropped 607 tons of bombs. The majority of the eight or nine blast-wall protected buildings received direct hits, and the remainder suffered so many near misses o that their subsequent operational value was negligible. -Jn addition, thej aerial masts were all demolished, and the two dispersed sites were also hit. (d) Cherbourg/Urville-Hague. This station is now known to have been the headquarters of the German Signals Intelligence Service in North-Western France. The attack on this important W/T centre was made on 3/4th June by 99 aircraft dropping 570 tons of 'bombs. The results were remarkable, the centre of a very neat bomb pattern coinciding almost exactly with the centre of the target area. The photographic interpretation report may be quoted verbatim: ' " The station is completely useless. The site itself is rendered unsuitable for rebuilding the installation, without much effort being expended in levelling and filling in the craters." 112. The success of this last attack on the Headquarters of the German Air Force Signals Intelligence must have been a major catastrophe for the enemy, and it may well be that it was an important contributory factor to the lack of enemy air reaction to the assault. 113. Radio Counter-Measures. On the night of 5/6th June in the opening* phase of the assault, counter-measures against such installations as were still active were put into operation. These counter-measures covered five separate and distinct tasks: — (a] a combined naval/air diversion against Cap d'Antifer: (6) a combined naval/air diversion against Boulogne: (c) a jamming barrage to cover the airborne forces: (d) a V.H.F. jamming support for the first three counter-measures: (e) feints for the airborne forces. These various components of the countermeasure plan were inter-dependent and the results can, therefore, best be summarised by giving an indication of the enemy's reactions. 114. The most important fact concerning this icaotion was that the enemy appeared to mistake the diversion towards Cap d'Antifer as a genuine threat; at all events, the enemy opened up, 'both with searchlights and guns on the imaginary convoy. Further, the V.H.F. jamming support which was flown by a formation of aircraft operating in the Somme area apparently led the enemy to ibelieve that these aircraft were the spearhead of a major bomber force, as he reacted with twenty-four night fighters, which were active approximately .three hours, hunting the " ghost " bomber stream. 115. The other counter-measures all fulfilled their purpose and it can be stated that the application of radio counter-measures immediately preceding the assault proved to be extraordinarily successful. Only three out of •the total number of 105 aircraft employed on these operations were lost, and the crew of one of these aircraft was saved. 116. While it is not possible to state with certainty that the enemy was completely unaware of the crossHChannel movement of the assault forces, the success of tht- plan to disrupt his Radar cover and W/T facilities both by attacks and by the application of countermeasures, can toe judged on the results obtained. In the vital period between oioo and 0400 hours on 6tih June, when the assault Armada was nearing the beaches, only nine enemy Radar installations - were in operation, and during the whole night, the number of stations active in the " Neptune " area was only 18 out of a normal 92. No station between Le Havre and Barfleur was heard operating. Apart from .the abortive reaction mentioned in paragraph 114, no enemy air attacks were made till approximately 1500 hours on D-Day, and this despite the presence of more than 2,000 ships and landing craft in the assault area, and despite the fact that very large airborne forces had, of necessity, been routed down the west coast of the Cherbourg Peninsula right over the previously excellent Radar cover of the Cherbourg area and the Channel Islands. 117. These results may be summarised as follows: the enemy did not obtain the early warning of our approach that his Radar coverage should have made possible; there is every reason to suppose 'that Radar controlled gunfire was interfered with; no fighter aircraft hindered our airborne operations; the enemy was confused and his troop movements were delayed. 118. Prior to the launching of Operation " Neptune " each service had almost complete freedom to use radio counter-measures, as desired. To eliminate any clash of interests when very large forces would foe employed in confined areas, an inter-Service staff was set -up at my Headquarters. The primary concern being -to get the Armada safely across the Channel, it was agreed that for the 30-hour period immediately prior to the moment of assault, control should be vested in the Allied Naval Gommander-in-Oiief; subsequently, control of radio counter-measures became my responsibility. The advisory staff with representatives of .the three Services, assisted both the Allied Naval.Commander-in-Chief and myself. Attacks on Military Facilities 119. As well as preparing the way for the assault forces by attacking the enemy's coastal defences and Radar system, it was planned to prepare the way further for the landing by reducing the enemy military potential, both' in the assault and rear areas. Certain ammunition and fuel dumps, military camps and headquarters wore considered suitable targets for attack, in order to fulfil this purpose.
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120. In the period ist May to 5th June, 1944, the following effort was made on these targets. Sorties R.Ps. Fired Bombs dropped 423 282 x 6o-lb. 152 tons 1,139 — 5*218 tons Force A.E.A.F R.A.F. Bomber Command ... 1,562 282 X 6o-lb. 5,370 tons 121. The following details of some of these attacks indicate the very great damage done to the enemy supply dumps, and the attacks must also have had considerable moral effect on enemy personnel in addition ,to the actual casualties inflicted. 122. On the night of 3rd/4t!h May, R.A.F. Bomber Command attacked in force the tank depot at Mailly-le-Camp. 1,924 tons > of bombs were dropped and assessment photographs show the whole target to have been severely damaged. In the mechanical transport section and barracks, 34 out of 47 buildings were totally destroyed. Even more remarkable results were obtained by an attack on an ammunition 'dump at Chateaudun carried out on the same night. Eight Mosquitoes of R.A.F. Bomber Command attacked with approximately 13 tons of bombs. The 'bombs were dropped very accurately and caused sympathetic detonation throughout the dump. In tiie resulting explosion, the entire western wing of the depot, containing 90 buildings, was completely destroyed. 123. The Bourg Leopold military camp in Belgium was heavily attacked on two occasions. On nth/i2th May, aircraft of R.A.F. Bomber Command dropped 585 tons of bombs on ithis depot. On the night of 27th/ 28th May, a force of 324 aircraft, also from that Command, dropped 1,348 tons of bombs, and photographic reconnaissance revealed very heavy damage 'throughout the whole area of the camp. Six large buildings and at least 150 'personnel huts received direct hits. 124. Smaller in scale, but very effective, were the attacks made by A.E.A.F. aircraft on other targets of this type. On 2nd June, a force of 50 Thunderbolts of the United States Ninth Adr Force attacked a fuel dump at Domfront. 54 x goo-lb incendiaries and 63 x i,ooo-lb. G.P. bombs were dropped and severe damage was caused to this dump. Harassing o/ Coastwise Shipping and Sea Mining. 125. As a result of the successful attacks on the overland communications of the enemy, his coastal shipping became increasingly important. The task of dealing with this shipping was very largely the work of R.A.F. Coastal Command, but Typhoons of A.E.A.F. also operated on occasions in an anti-shipping role under the operational control of Coastal Command, and Spitfires of A.E.A.F. provided when needed fighter escort to the strike aircraft of Coastal Command. The sea mining programme was carried out by R.A.F. Bomber Command in direct consultation with the British Admiralty. 126. During the period ist April to 5th June, 1944, R.A.F. Coastal Command flew 4,340 sorties on the anti-shipping and anti-U-Boat patrols in the Bay of Biscay, along the Dutch Coast and in the Channel. During these sorties, 103 attacks were, made on shipping and 22 on U-Boats. 127. The minelaying had as its objectives not only the interruption of enwny coastal ships ping, but also in the closing stages of preparation for the assault, the laying of minebelts, to afford protection to the Allied assault and naval bombardment forces from attacks by E and R boats, especially those operating from Le Havre and Cherbourg. 128. In the period ist April to 5th June, R.A.F. Bomber Command flew 990 sorties and laid 3,099 mines in the areas east of Texel and along the Dutch, Belgian and French coasts. Other mines were also sown in German home waters, including many in the Baltic Sea. Attacks on Airfields. 129. I have already dealt (see paragraphs 42 to 47) with the preliminary operations designed to wear down the G.A.F. and render it powerless seriously to interfere with the assault. As D-Day approached however, it became necessary to ensure that our measure of air superiority was fully adequate to our needs. Plans had accordingly been made for direct attacks upon the enemy air force, particularly in France and the Low Countries. The effect of these plans was to deny the German Air Force the advantage of disposition which its fighter squadrons would otherwise enjoy as compared with our own in the initial stages of the assault. It was, therefore, necessary to neutralise a considerable number of airfields within a radius of 150 miles of Caen. The primary object of these attacks was to destroy the aircraft repair, maintenance and servicing facilities and thereby cause the maximum interference with the operational ability of the German Air Force. 130. I planned that these attacks should start at least three weeks before D-Day, and they actually began on nth May, 1944. It was necessary to bear in mind in the planning of these attacks that no indication should be given as to the selected area for the Allied landings. 131. Allocation of Targets.—Forty main operational airfields were selected for attack. Twelve were assigned to R.A.F. Bomber Command and the remaining twenty-eight to A.E.A.F. and the United States Eighth Air Force. 132. Fifty-nine other operational bomber •bases with important facilities located in France, Belgium, Holland and Western Germany within range of the assault area and ports of embarkation in the United Kingdom were also selected for attack, as opportunity permitted, 'by aircraft of the United States Eighth and- Fifteenth Air Forces, the latter based in the Mediterranean area. 133. From nth May, 1944 to D-Day, thirtyfour of the most important airfields were attacked by 3,915 aircraft dropping 6,717 tons of bombs with the result that four airfields were placed in Category " A " and fifteen in
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Category " B ". Twelve airfields of the second list were attacked by the Eighth Air Force with very satisfactory results. 134. The following categories of airfield damage were used:— Category " A "—major installations completely destroyed; no further attacks needed. Category " B "—major installations severely damaged; further attacks warranted. Category " C "—minor damage; further attacks required. 135. Statistical Summary of Attacks on Airfields during the period nth May to D-Day. Force Attacks A.E.A.F. Ninth Air Force 56 Second T.A.F 12 R.A.F. Bomber Command 6 U.S. Eighth Air Force 17 Sorties 2,550 312 119 934 3,915 Bombs 3,197 tons 487 tons 395 tons 2,638 tons 6,717 tons 136. These attacks on enemy airfields accomplished the desired object of placing the enemy under the same handicap as the Allied fighters by forcing them to operate from airfields a long way from the assault area. They were also largely responsible for the lack of enemy air interference with our landings and undoubtedly contributed much to the ineffectiveness of the German Air Force at the really critical times. Photographic Reconnaissance. 137. The photographic reconnaissance units of the Allied air forces were the first to begin active and direct preparation for the invasion of Europe from the West. For more than a year, much vital information,.was accumulated which contributed vdfry greatly to the ultimate success of the assault. The variety, complexity and moreover, the detailed accuracy of the information gathered and assiduously collated was of great importance in the preparatory phase of the operation. 138. Each particular service had its own requirements and individual problems which only photographic reconnaissance could hope to solve. Then again, within each service, specialised sections relied to a great extent for their information on these sources, e.g. as early as possible after each major bombing attack, damage assessment sorties were flown. 139. Photographic coverage of the entire coastline from Holland to the Spanish frontier was obtained to gather full details of the coastal defences. Verticals and obliques were taken of beach gradients, beach obstacles, coastal defences and batteries. Full photographic coverage from Granville to Flushing, both in obliques and verticals, was obtained. This very large coverage also served to hide our special interest in the selected assault beaches. 140. Obliques were taken at wave top height, three to four miles out from the coast, in order to provide the assault coxswains with a landing craft view of the particular area to be assaulted or likely to be their allotted landing spots. Then obliques were flown 1,500 yards from the coast at zero feet, to provide platoon assault commanders with recognition landing points. Further obliques were taken, again at 1,500 yards from the shore, but at 2,000 feet to provide, for those who were planning the infantry assault, views of the immediate hinterland. 141. Inland strips were photographed behind the assault areas, looking southwards, so that infantry commanders could pinpoint themselves after they had advanced. Again, it was necessary to photograph hidden land behind assault areas, so that the infantry commanders would know the type of terrain behind such obstructions as hills or woods. 142. Bridges over rivers were photographed and special attention was paid to the river banks to enable the engineers to plan the type of construction necessary to supply temporary bridges in the event of the enemy blowing up the regular bridges. 143. The prospective airfield sites were selected by the engineers after they had studied the vast quantity of reconnaissance photographs available. The success of the Airfield Construction Units, some details of which are given in Part IV of this Despatch, is testimony to the value of this reconnaissance. 144. It was also necessary to cover all the likely dropping areas for the use of the airborne divisions, and to pay special attention to each area for concealed traps such as spikes, etc. These traps were observed on photographs of many sites chosen and it was necessary to make other plans accordingly. 145. Flooding areas, too, throughout Holland, Belgium and France were all photographed at different periods, thus ensuring to the Army Commander full knowledge of these defences in planning the deployment of his forces. The extent to which army commanders depended upon photographic reconnaissance may be gauged by the volume of cover they received. In the two weeks prior to D-Day, one R.A.F. Mobile Field Photographic Section alone made for Army requirements more than 120,000 prints. 146. Continued photographic reconnaissance was also flown covering enemy communication centres, petrol, oil and lubricant dumps, headquarters, inland defences and military concentrations. These reconnaissances provided invaluable information as to the enemy order of battle and his capabilities. 147. Many small scale sorties were flown for Combined Operations, enabling them to make landings at selected spots, long before the real offensive was launched and to bring back vital information. 148. Another important task undertaken was the photographing of Allied landing craft, equipment and stores in the United Kingdom, to facilitate experiments with the type of camouflage most likely to be effective.
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149. The demands of all three services for photographic cover were very varied and so great in number that it was necessary to set up a controlling body to deal with them. Accordingly, the Central Reconnaissance Committee was established at your headquarters. This inter-service1 committee received requests for photographic cover from all services and allocated the task to the most suitable reconnaissance force. One of the most important functions of this Committee was to watch the security aspect of the reconnaissance effort and by ensuring that this effort was judiciously distributed, conceal from the enemy our special interest in the assault area. 150. The bulk of this invaluable reconnaissance effort was flown by aircraft of A.E.A.F. which, in the period ist April to 5th June flew no less than 3,215 photographic reconnaissance sorties. Aircraft of other commands, however, including 106 Group, R.A.F. Coastal Command and United States Eighth Air Force, operating under the control of R.A.F. Station, Benson, also contributed notably to this work, flying a total of 1,519 sorties during the same period. The excellent co-operation between British and American reconnaissance units in fact enabled the needs of all services to be fully met by D-Day. 151. If we had had to rely, however, entirely on orthodox high altitude reconnaissance aircraft for this work, 'not more than a small proportion of these needs could have been met. The weather in Western Europe, never very suitable for high altitude photography, was particularly bad in the early part of the year. There was an urgent need for a medium/low altitude photographic reconnaissance aircraft to supplement high altitude reconnaissance. It was decided, therefore, to convert some Mustang fighters into tactical and strategical medium/ low altitude reconnaissance aircraft. They were equipped with oblique cameras, were armed to protect themselves and were fast enough to outpace most German fighters. 152. Low altitude reconnaissance, however, whether visual or photographic was at all times a hazardous business in view of the risk of being jumped by higher flying enemy fighters. None the less, early results achieved by Mustangs were very encouraging and eventually a number of reconnaissance squadrons were partly reequipped with converted Mustangs to supplement their high altitude aircraft. Their work proved invaluable and the development of this aircraft for photographic reconnaissance work has been one of the outstanding lessons of the air war. Protection of the Assembling of the Assault Forces. 153. I stated in paragraph 25 that one of the main tasks of the air forces was to support the landing of the Allied armies in Europe. As a corollary, the air force was required to protect the assembling of the assault forces. A.E.A.F. was directly charged with this responsibility. 154. More than 2,000 ships and landing craft were used to lift the initial assault forces and other equipment, and they were supported by task forces of over 100 warships including battleships and more than 200 escorts and other naval vessels. In all, over 6,000 ships and landing craft were employed in the first week. 155. The assembly, preparation and loading of these ships and other special beach installations necessitated. the concentration of enormous forces in the ports and harbours of the south coast of England, in the Bristol Channel and in the Thames Estuary, over long periods, with especially heavy concentrations in the final six weeks. Moreover, large scale embarkation had to be practised to ensure that speed and flexibility could be attained. To provide this practice, a series of exercises were staged in which the forces to be employed were brought into the concentration areas and in some cases, embarked and sailed to practice assault beaches on the south coast of England. 156. Enemy Action against Assault Forces.— It was estimated by my Planning Staff that the German Air Force would have available 850 aircraft, including 450 long range bombers to use against the Allied assault operation. I anticipated that these bomber forces would be used against shipping in ports and in transit, both in bombing attacks and in sea mining. It was further estimated that this force would be capable of the following scale of effort over a period of three weeks during the assembling and loading periods: — Sorties. Sustained per night ... ... • 25 Intensive per night for 2-3 nights per week 50-75 Maximum in any one night ... 100-150 157. In fact, the enemy activity did not reach this maximum scale of effort. There were three periods of activity in the sfec weeks prior to 6th June, and they involved only 377 bombing sorties. 158. On 25th-a6th April, approximately 40 aircraft operated against Portsmouth and Havant. On 26-27th April, approximately 80 aircraft again attacked Portsmouth and a triangular area 'between the Needles, Basingstoke and Worthing. On 29-30th April, approximately 35 aircraft operated over and off Plymouth. 159. The second phase of these attacks took place on the nights i4-i5th and i5-i6th May, when approximately 100 and 80 aircraft respectively operated against Southampton and along the coast, and against Weymouth. 160. The third phase was during 28-2gth 20,-30th and 3O-3ist May; on the first of these nights, approximately 35 aircraft attacked from Dartmouth to Start Point and on the next two nights small forces operated indiscriminately. 161. The night fighter forces of the Air Defence of Great Britain were ready to deal with this activity. Of the total of 377 enemy sorties, night fighters claimed 22 destroyed, 6 probably destroyed and 5 damaged, while a further 2 were destroyed by anti-aircraft fire. 162. A valuable contribution to the defence of the assembly areas for the assault forces was made by balloons and anti-aircraft guns. Units were provided for this purpose by R.A.F. Balloon Command, the R.A.F. Regiment, Anti- Aircraft Command and certain Anti-Aircraft artillery formations of the United States forces. Operational control of these units was in general exercised on my behalf by the Air Marshal Commanding, Air Defence of Great Britain. 163. The work of these units not only in protecting the assembly, but later, in defence
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against attacks by Flying Bombs, was of exceptional value to the launching and maintenance of the assault. I deal with certain other features of this work later in this Despatch. 164. It was also of the utmost importance to deny to the enemy, air reconnaissance of Southern England. Special precautions had to be taken to this end. 165. Mastery of the air over the Channel, wrested from the enemy in earlier years by aircraft of R.A.F. Fighter Command (later Air Defence of Great Britain), had done much to ensure this end already. Daylight operations of enemy aircraft overland were almost unheard of and it was appreciated that only dire -necessity would prompt the enemy to expose his aircraft and pilots to the heavy risk they would run in attempting to spy out our preparations. None the less, the enemy had now so much at stake that a great effort on his part was to be expected. To deal with possible enemy reconnaissance efforts, therefore, I directed that standing high and low level fighter patrols should be maintained by aircraft of Air Defence of Great Britain during daylight hours over certain coastal belts. 166. In the six weeks immediately prior to D-Day, however, the enemy flew only 125 reconnaissance sorties in the Channel area and 4 sorties over the Thames Estuary and the east coast. Very few of these sorties approached land, most of them being fleeting appearances in mid-Channel. Our fighters rarely got even a glimpse of these enemy aircraft, which could have seen very little and could only have taken hack, therefore, information of very small •value; bat as an extra deterrent, standing patrols were maintained as far out as 40-50 miles south of the Isle of Wight and intruder aircraft were directed to the enemy airfields in the Dinard area, from which it was believed such enemy reconnaissance aircraft as appeared •were operating. In the result, the enemy appears to have learnt very little. 167. These defensive measures, coupled with •the others to which I have already referred, achieved for the assault a complete tactical surprise on D-Day and did much to ensure the safety of the cross-Channel movement of the assault forces. The weather factor relating to ihis aspect of the operations is considered in paras. 405 and 406. 168. On many days Allied air forces flew more photographic reconnaissance sorties in one •day than the enemy flew in the whole of the vital period of six weeks prior to D-Day. In view of the fact that the enemy was aware, in .general terms, of our intention to invade the Continent the small scale of his air reconnaissance effort is, to say the least, extraordinary. " Crossbow." Operations. 169. It became known early in 1943 that the -enemy was preparing an attack on the United Kingdom with flying bombs and rockets launched from the French coast. Much experimental work on these projectiles had been done in the Baltic Sea area, and it was believed that the enemy would shortly be in a position to begin constructing sites, from which the projectiles could be launched. Construction began chiefly in the Pas de Calais and the Cherbourg •areas during the autumn of 1943. 170. Considerable research into the nature of -.these novel weapons was carried out by Operational Research Sections and by a special Committee set up in the Air Ministry, and it was • concluded that they represented a potentially serious menace, both to the United Kingdom and to the preparation and build-up of forces for the projected Operation " Neptune". Accordingly, it became necessary to divert part of the available air effort to attacks on these constructional sites in order to prevent the threat becoming a reality. 171. At this time it was not considered desirable to divert any large part of the heavy bomber effort from the commitment on " Pointblank " targets. I was, therefore, made responsible for taking the necessary countermeasures with the forces of A.E.A.F. In addition, however, a proportion of the effort of the heavy bombers of the United States Eighth Air Force was made available to me for this task on days when weather was unsuitable for deep penetration raids into Germany. The United States IXth Bomber Command was committed, up to ist April, to assist the strategical air forces with diversionary raids, and therefore, was not always available for these operations. R.A.F. Bomber Command was also originally allotted five sites for attack, but this commitment was subsequently re-allotted to A.E.A.F. ' 172. As is now known, the menace was not under-estimated, and the air effort prior to DDay did not succeed wholly in removing it. 173. The sites were classified as follows: — (a) Ski-sites—(so called because of a b% store room construction which from the air looked very like a ski)—designed for launching flying bombs. (6) Rocket sites—larger constructions designed for the launching of heavy rocket projectiles. (c) Supply sites. 174. The sites were given the code word of " Noball " and operations against them were carried out under the code word " Crossbow ". These operations began on 5th December, 1943, and accordingly the summary of activity in this section of the Despatch is shown from this date to D-Day. . 175. On 5th December, 1943, 63 ski sites and 5 rocket sites had been identified. It appeared that the sites in the Pas de Calais area were aligned on London and those in the Cherbourg area on Bristol. It was calculated that the enemy was completing new sites at the rate of three every two days. 176. A schedule of priorities based on the British Air Ministry recommendations was carefully worked out. It was most important to ensure that no more bombs than were absolutely necessary to neutralise one target should be dropped before an attack was made against the next target on the priority list. A system was devised of " suspending " a site from further attack, whereby a Command which considered that it had inflicted sufficient damage to a site to neutralise it temporarily, was authorised to notify any authority concerned that the site was " suspended " from further attack, pending photographic confirmation of the damage done. 177. The attacks on sites prior to D-Day are listed below. At D-Day it was estimated that out of 97 identified flying bomb sites, 86 had been neutralised, and out of 7 identified rocket sites, 2 had been neutralised.
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178. In addition, heavy attacks were launched on several special supply or storage sites which had been observed under construe-" tion. 179. The ski sites were normally well hidden, either hi or at the edge of woods, well camouflaged and heavily defended by flak so that low flying attacks on them were costly. In photographs their presence was recognised not only by the shape and layout of the buildings, particularly the comprehensive water supply system, but also by the specially built roads and railways that led to them. 180. It was not appreciated before D-Day that in addition to these specially constructed ski sites, there were modified ski sites with all the facilities of the original sites except for the distinctive ski buildings and the water supply system. After D + 7, the day on which the enemy first launched flying bombs against the United Kingdom, photographic reconnaissance revealed the existence of 74 of these modified sites. They were camouflaged more completely than the original sites and made use of existing roads and buildings. Details of attacks on these modified ski sites or launching sites are included in my account of air operations in the post-assault phase. 181. The exact number of flying bombs which the known number of ski sites were capable of launching against the United Kingdom if they had not been attacked by aircraft can only be estimated, but it is thought that some 6,000 flying bombs per 24 hours is a reasonable estimate. The success of the air forces, therefore, in attacking and neutralising Germany's capacity to use this secret weapon may be judged in terms of the figures of actual flying bombs launched after D-Day. These figures are set out in the account of the post-assault phase. 182. Summary of Attacks on Ski Sites prior to D-Day. Force Sorties A.E.A.F 22,280 U.S. Eighth Air Force 4,589 26,869 Bombs 13,515 tons 7,968 tons 21,483 tons Summary of Attacks on Rocket Sites prior to D-Day Force - Sorties Bombs A.E.A.F 434 667 tons U.S. Eighth Air Force 2,045 7,624 tons 2,479 8,291 tons Force A.E.A.F. Summary of Attacks on Supply Sites and Dumps prior to D-Day U.S. Eighth Air Force Sorties Bombs 852 1,148 tons and I26x6o-lb. R.Ps. 166 479 tons 1,018 1,627 tons and I26x6o-lb. R.Ps. Statistical Summary of Preparatory Operations 183. The following statistics show the immense scale of the effort of the Allied air forces operating from the United Kingdom against both " Overlord " and " Pointblank " targets during the preparatory phase ist April to 5th June, 1944. That the achievements referred to in the foregoing paragraphs were not accomplished without considerable cost inskilled manpower is evident from the aircraft casualty figures included. Statistics covering personnel casualties in the preparatory period are included in the schedule at paragraph 408" in Part III (d). Force A.E.A.F. :— Ninth A.F. 2ndT.A.F. A.D.G.B. R.A.F.B.C. U.S. Eighth A.F..:— VIIIthB.C. ... VIIIthF.C. ... Preparatory Operations Period ist April—$th June, 1944 Aircraft Tons of bombs despatched dropped 53,784 28,587 18,639 24,621 37,804 31,820 195,255 30,657 6,981 87,238 69,857 647 I95,38o Aircraft lost in combat 197 133 46 557 763 291 EfA destroyed in combat 189 66 in 77 724 1,987 2,655- Total sorties as above R.A.F. Coastal Command 195,255 5,384 200,639
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184. The sorties of Coastal Command included are only those on anti-shipping and anti-U-boat patrols in the Bay of Biscay and Channel areas and off the Dutch coast. The weight of depth charges, bombs, etc., dropped and casualties or claims arising from these sorties are not included. (c) The Assault Decision to make the Assault 185. After consultations with the Commanders- in-Chief of the three services, during May, you had fixed the date of the Assault for 5th June. The decision as to date had to be taken in good time to permit of the completion of final preparations. Some of the ships in the invasion Armada, for example, had to sail a week before the time planned for the assault. 186. As the date approached, the weather forecasts pointed to very serious deterioration in conditions for D-Day. On 3rd June, you summoned a conference at your Advanced Headquarters at Portsmouth to consider the weather situation. This conference included yourself, the Deputy Supreme Commander, Air Chief Marshal Sir A. W. Tedder, G.C.B., your Chief of Staff Lieutenant General W. B. Smith, forces, I considered, and I gave this as my opinion, that the Allied air effort possible would provide a reasonable measure of air protection and support and that airborne operations would be' practicable. 192. After considering also the weather conditions as affecting the land and sea operations, you made the decision that the assault was to take place on the first high tide in the morning of the 6th of June and that the airborne forces were to 'be flown over and dropped in their allotted zones before dawn of that day. The Assault is made 193. The assault was on a five divisional front on the east side of the Cherbourg Peninsula immediately north of the Carentan Estuary and the River Orne. 194. The First United States Army landed between Varreville and Colleville-sur-Mer; i R.C.T.* landed 'between Varreville and the Carentan Estuary, 2 R.C.T. between the Carentan Estuary and Colleville-sur-Mer. The Second British Army with five brigades, landed between Asnelles and Ouistreham. These seaborne forces were supported on their flanks by 'Admiral Sir Bertram H. Ramsay, K.C.B., two airborne forces, two United States Airborne K.B.E., M.V.O., and his Chief of Staff, General Sir Bernard L. Montgomery, K.C.B., D.S.O., and his Chief of Staff, and the Heads of the Naval, Army and Ah* Meteorological Services. I attended this conference with my Senior Air Staff Officer, Air Vice-Marshal H. E. P. Wigglesworth, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.C. 187. The first meeting took place at 2100 hours on 3rd June. It lasted until after midnight, when you decided to postpone any decision until the meteorological staffs could collect later reports. 188. The second meeting took place at 0400 hours on 4th June, and in the light of weather forecasts then available, you decided to postpone the time of the assault for 24 hours, primarily on the grounds that the air forces would be unable to provide adequate support for the crossing and assault operations, and could not undertake the airborne tasks. 189. The meeting reassembled at 2100 hours on 4th June, and after considerable deliberation a decision was again deferred to enable the meteorological staffs to study later data. 190. The final meeting took place at 0430 hours in the morning of 5th June. Weather conditions forecast (for the following day were still far from satisfactory and from the air pouit of view, below the planned acceptable minimum. 191. Nevertheless, taking into account the fact that the adverse weather conditions imposed an equal handicap on the enemy air United States Type Forces Medium Bombers Light Bombers Fighter and Fighter Bombers Transport Aircraft ... Reconnaissance Aircraft ... Artillery Observation Aircraft A.S.R. (Miscellaneous) Powered A/C Total Gliders Grand Total ... 532 194 i,3H 1,166 158 Divisions being dropped and landed in the area of St. Mere Eglise, and a British Airborne Division in the.area between the Rivers Orne and Dives. The mapf facing shows the landing beaches and the positions gained in the first three weeks of the assault. 195. The first airborne forces landed before dawn on 6th June and the landing barges and craft coming in on the first tide, touched down at 0630 hours. Follow-up forces were landed with tiie second tide, and in the evening, additional airborne forces were flown in. 196. There was no.enemy opposition to the original passage of the assault or airborne forces. This fact is all the more remarkable when it is remembered that many of the ships had, of necessity, been at sea for periods of some days. 197. I have set out in Section (b) of Part II at paragraph 35, the tasks undertaken by 'the air forces in support of the assault. For convenience of presentation, these tasks have been dealt with under the five headings shown below:— Protection of the Cross-Channel Movement, Neutralisation of Coastal and Beach Defences, Protection of the Beaches, Dislocation of Enemy Communications and Control, Airborne operations. 198. The Order of Battle of A.E.A.F. as at D-Day is set out at Appendix " D ",f the strength of aircraft available was as follows:— * R.C.T. = Regimental Combat Team. Maps and Appendices not reproduced.
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Protection of the Cross-Channel movement. 199. The task of assisting the naval forces to protect the passage of the assault armies from surface and U-boat attack, was undertaken chiefly 'by R.A.F. Coastal Command though aircraft of A.E.A.F. assisted in this task. I deal with these operations in more detail in paragraph 387 et seq. Here I need only mention that on D-Day and D + I, aircraft of R.A.F. Coastal Command flew 353 sorties on anti-shipping and anti-U-boat patrols. A line of patrols was provided at either end of the Channel. The air protection thus afforded contributed much to the safety of the Allied shipping from both surface and underwater attack by enemy naval forces. 200. Fifteen squadrons of fighters were allotted the task of protecting the shipping lanes. These squadrons flew 2,015 sorties during the course of D-Day and D + i, the cover being maintained at six squadron strength Coastal Batteries Crisbecq St. Martin de Varreville Ouistreham Maisy ... Mont Fleury La Parnelle St. Pierre du Mont Merville/Franceville ... Houlgate Longues 204. As R.A.F. Bomber Command left the assault area, United States Eighth Air Force heavy bombers took over the bombardment role. In the thirty minutes immediately preceding the touch-down hour, 1,365 heavy bombers attacked selected areas in the coastal defences, dropping 2,796 tons of bombs. The result of these operations added to the previous air bombardment and combined with the naval shelling, neutralised wholly or in large part almost all of the shore batteries and the opposition to the landings was very much less than was expected. 205. Medium, light and fighter bombers then took a hand in the attacks on the enemy defensive system by attacking artillery positions further inland and other targets in the coastal defences. The immense scale of this effort may be gauged from the statistics which appear after para. 233. 206. The heavy bombers of the United States Eighth Air Force operated again later in the^ day, and although cloud interfered with bomb-* ing about midday, necessitating the recall of some missions, a further 1,746 tons of bombs were dropped. In all, the Eighth Air Force flew 2,627 heavy bombers and 1,347 escort and offensive fighter sorties during the day. 207. Spotting for Naval Gunfire. The naval bombardment took place according to plan. Tn this bombardment, aircraft of A.E.A.F. played an important role. The Fleet Air Arm had stated early on in the planning that it would be unable to find from its own resources enough aircraft to provide for spotting for the gunfire of all the capital ships it was planned throughout this period. Owing to> the lack of enemy reaction, I was able later to reduce this cover to a two squadron force. 201. For convenience of presentation, I have set out the full plan for the employment of fighter forces during the assault and postassault phase in the next section. (See paragraph 308 et seq.) Neutralisation of Coastal and Beach Defences. 202. The task of neutralising as many of the coastal defence positions as possible during the crucial period of the assault was shared by naval and air bombardment. The air bombardment plan called for attacks to commence just before dawn on D-Day. 203. R.A.F. Bomber Command commenced the bombardment with attacks on the following ten selected heavy coastal batteries in the assault area: — Sorties 101 100 116 116 124 131 124 109 116 99 1,136 Tons of Bombs 598 613 645 592 585 668 698 382 468 604 5,853 tons to use. Accordingly, despite the unfortunate diversion of effort from air resources that were far from inexhaustible, I had agreed that two squadrons of Spitfires from A.D.G.B. and two wings (each of three squadrons) of Mustangs from R.A.F. Second Tactical Air Force should be trained for this task. At various times, therefore, well before D-Day, these squadrons had been trained with No. 3 Naval Fighter Wing. 208. The result was that on D-Day and subsequently, we were just able to meet the heavy calls for spotting for naval gunfire that were made on us. On D-Day, no less than 394 sorties were flown on this task/ of which 236 were flown by five squadrons of A.E.A.F. Each of the two Spitfire squadrons, No. 26 Squadron and No. 33 Squadron made 76 sorties in the course of the day. In all, during the period of consolidation in the beach-head, that is from 6th June to igth June, a total of 1,318 sorties on naval gunnery spotting were flown. Of this total, aircraft of A.E.A.F. flew 940. Five aircraft of A.E.A.F. vere destroyed on these operations during this period. 209. It may be pointed out here that further calls were made on these same A.E.A.F. squadrons at later stages in the campaign. The gunfire of the capital ships bombarding the isolated German garrisons in the fortresses of Cherbourg in late June, and of St. Malo and Brest in late August, was spotted for by these squadrons. On these duties a further 124 sorties were flown apart from those flown by aircraft of Fleet Air Arm.
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Protection of the Landing Beaches. 210. In addition to the cover given to the cross-Channel movement of the assault forces, I provided a continuous daylight fighter cover of the 'beach-head areas. Nine squadrons in two forces of six squadrons of low cover and three squadrons of 'high cover continuously patrolled over the British and American beaches. A reserve of six fighter squadrons on the ground were also kept at readiness to strengthen any point if the enemy came up to challenge. 211. On D-Day alone, 1,547 sorties were flown on beach-head cover. Night fighters also patrolled continuously during the hours of darkness over the beach-head and shipping lanes; six squadrons of Mosquitoes were available for these operations. Details of the organisation and control and of the scale of effort of the fighter forces are set out in the next section of this Despatch (see paragraph 308). 212. Balloon Defence of the Beach-head.— To supplement the defences provided by fighter aircraft and anti-aircraft guns, it had been decided to provide balloon protection for all beaches and artificial ports (Mulberries). It was thought that balloons would give valuable protection against low-flying attacks and would permit economies in the number of light A.A. weapons that would be needed in the early stages of the assault. 213. Operational control of these balloons was vested in the local A.A. Defence Commander. In practice, balloons flew at 2,000 feet by night and just below cloud base by day. Suitable control funnels, within which balloons were grounded by day, were arranged so as to avoid interference with approaches to air strips. 214. In Part IV of this Despatch I give further details of some of the difficulties experienced and overcome in planning the employment of these balloons. Here I need only comment on the results achieved. The passive nature of balloon defence and the monotonous lack of results make it difficult to compute its value. There were practically no reports of low-level bombing attacks by enemy aircraft during the periods the balloons were flying, and such bombing as did occur was scattered, doing little damage to the beach maintenance and none to the Mulberries. One enemy aircraft was destroyed by a -balloon on the beaches in the U.S. sector. Apart from the positive value of balloons as a deterrent to low-flying enemy attacks, I feel that the presence of balloons has, in itself, a definite morale value for both Naval and Army personnel. Dislocation of enemy communications and control. 215. Air operations to dislocate enemy control of operations in the field were begun on the day before the assault. This dislocation of the enemy control went even further than the previous attacks on his Radar chain. The latter had blinded the enemy to the movement of the Allied assault forces; the air operations now proceeded to impede and disrupt in advance any possible enemy moves to make good his initial setback. To do this I tried during the initial stage of the assault, to break up the enemy machinery of control and signals communications and by so doing to make as difficult as possible the co-ordination of enemy counterattacks. Chateaux known to house German Corps and Divisional Headquarters and also German Army telephone exchanges were attacked on the evening0 of 5th June and through D-Day by fighters with bombs and rocket projectiles. These operations undoubtedly seriously embarrassed the enemy, both during the assault and later, when a large number of enemy headquarters were knocked out. 216. The Air Forces also were quite successful in causing casualties among German Generals. Field Marshal Rommel himself was fatally wounded in an air attack and it is believed that a further six to eight Commanders were also casualties. The killing in an air attack of a Divisional Commander during a critical stage of the fighting at St. Lo is thought to have had an important effect on the course of the Battle. Airborne Operations. 217. The general plan of the airborne operations called for the dropping and landing of three divisions of parachute and gliderborne troops, and for the initial reinforcement and resupply of these formations. 218. Two of these divisions were the loist and 82nd United States Airborne Divisions and their task was to assist in the capture of the Cotentin Peninsula by aiding the seaborne landing of the First United States Army, and by preventing enemy reinforcements-from moving into the peninsula from the south. The particular tasks of these divisions were to capture the areas of St. Mere Eglise and St. Martin and the neighbouring coastal defences. 219. The third division was the 6th British Airborne Division and its task was to operate on the left (eastern) flank of ist Corps of the Second British Army, in the area between the Orne and Dives Rivers. The particular tasks of this division were: — (a) to secure intact, and hold, the two bridges over the River Orne-Caen canal at Bonouville and Ranville: (b) to neutralise an important enemy coastal battery and capture or neutralise a key strongpoint: (c) to secure a firm base, including bridgeheads east of the River Orne: (d) to prevent enemy reinforcements (including Panzer units) from moving towards the British left flank from the east and southeast. To accomplish these objects, 3 and 5 Paratroop Brigade Groups flew in with a limited number of gliders carrying details of the 6th Airborne Division Headquarters on the night of D-i/D-Day, and were followed by the 6th Air Landing Brigade on the evening of D-Day. 220. A limited number of S.A.S. troops were dropped in selected areas before and after D-Day for special missions, by aircraft of No. 38 Group. 221. The airlift of all these forces was provided by the transport aircraft of A.E.A.F.
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carried the American divisions and No. 38 Group and No. 46 Group of the Royal Air Force, carried the British Force. 222. U.S. IXth JTroop Carrier Command.— The paratroops of the loist Division were dropped by aircraft of the United States IXth Troop Carrier Command in the general area of St. Mere Eglise, shortly after midnight on the night of June 5th-6th (Operation Albany). The glider force of the loist Division went in at dawn of D-Day into the same area, in 58 gliders (Operation Chicago). A re-supply mission was flown for the loist Division on the night of D +1 (Operation Keokuk). This re-supply mission was necessary as there had been no contact between the loist Division and the seaborne assaulting forces. 223. Paratroops of the 82nd Division were flown in in aircraft of IXth Troop Carrier Command and dropped in the general area of St. Sauveur le Vicomte (Operation Boston), shortly after midnight of 5th-6th June. Glider elements of this division were flown in as follows:— 52 Gliders at dawn of D-Day (Operation Detroit). 177 Gliders at dusk of D-Day (Operation Elmira). 98 Gliders at dawn of D + i (Operation Galveston). 101 Gliders at dusk of D + i (Operation Hackensack). Re-supply missions for the 82nd Division were flown on the nights of D +1 and D + 2 with 148 and 117 aircraft respectively, carrying a total of approximately 432 tons of supplies. (Operations Freeport and Memphis.) 224. Nos. 38 and 46 Groups, Royal Air Force. The tasks of these groups were as follows:— (a) Dropping of S.A.S. troops— (i) D - i/D-Day: Reconnaissance parties to be dropped in each of six areas (Operation Sunflower i). (ii) D + 1/2: Dropping of task forces in Brittany (Operation Coney), (iii) D + 3/4: Dropping of base parties in the six areas mentioned above (Operation Sunflower II). (iv) Re-supply to base parties as required (Operation Sunflower III). (&) Dropping and landing of 3rd and 5th Paratroop Brigade Groups plus a proportion of Division troops on the night of D - i/D-Day (Operation Tonga). (c) Landing of the 6th Air Landing Brigade on the evening of D-Day (Operation Mallard). (d) Re-supply of the 3rd and 5th Para- - troop Brigade Groups on the night of D/D + i (Operation Robroy I). (e) Subsequent re-supply mission for the 6th British Airborne Division (Operation Robroy II, III, etc.). 225. All these operations were carried out successfully, and with a remarkably low casualty rate, as will be evident from the statistics following' para. 233. Total losses amounted to 3^ per cent, and 2£ per cent, respectively of the British and American sorties flown. 226. These airborne operations constituted the greatest air lift of assault forces that had ever been attempted. Up to date, they are exceeded only by the immense operations of the First Allied Airborne Army in mid- September. The accuracy with which these forces were delivered to the allotted zones contributed greatly to the rapid success of their coups de main. 227. Provision of Air Support. All the airborne forces and re-supply missions which were flown in daylight were given adequate fighter cover; in addition, the fighter cover to the assault areas and reserves were held in readiness to assist in the protection of these forces. There were no losses due to attack by enemy aircraft on any formation of troop carriers. 228. In the period D-Day to D + 4, 1,839 sorties were flown by special fighter escort to airborne forces, and a further 419 sorties were flown as escort to later re-supply missions. As additional support, special forces of intruders operated against anti-aircraft positions. in the vicinity of the dropping and landing zones and others preceded the main forces across the coast to silence light anti-aircraft batteries on the run-in. The lightness of the casualties, which were much fewer than might reasonably have been expected, is evidence of the effectiveness of these support operations. Review of Additional Air Operations in Support of the Assault. 229. In addition to the specific tasks set out in the preceding paragraphs, many subsidiary ones were also undertaken by the Allied air forces during the assault period. These operations are briefly reviewed in the next paragraphs. 230. Fighter escort was given to the bombers operating by day and these fighters then went on to attack enemy movements. The fighters of A.E.A.F. flew offensive patrols against all road and rail movement within the tactical area and the fighters of the United States Eighth Air Force continued this work farther afield beyond the boundary of the tactical areas. 231. A large effort was expended on reconnaissance sorties on both D-Day and D + i. The deep reconnaissances revealed the reactions of the enemy, as shown by his movements of reinforcements to the battle area. The short range reconnaissances were also of invaluable assistance to the Army Commanders. 232. With such large forces operating, the Air/Sea Rescue Service was fully occupied. 198 patrols were flown during the two days and, together with the surface craft, these patrols succeeded in locating and rescuing a considerable number of Allied personnel. 233. The following statistics, covering the air operations in support of the assault, show the great effort of the Allied air forces on D-Day and D + i. This effort, concentrated over a comparatively small area, surpassed in strength any air operations that had ever before been mounted.
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(d) Operations subsequent to D-Day. Plan of Presentation 234. As in the previous sections of the narrative part of this Despatch, I propose to deal with the operations in the period D-Day to 3Oth September, 1944, under types of operations, rather than on a time basis. For this purpose the following headings have been adopted:— Attacks on Enemy Communications. Close Support Operations. Attacks on Coastal Garrisons. Fighter Cover to the Assault and the Shipping Lanes. Enemy Air Reaction and the Allied Attacks on the G.A.F. and its bases. Defence against Flying Bombs and Attacks on " Crossbow " targets. Operations of First Allied Airborne Army. Attacks on Naval Targets. Strategical Bombing—" Pointblank."
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Attacks on Enemy Communications. 235. I have dealt with the task undertaken by the air forces (see para. 51 et seq.) of dislocating, prior to D-Day, the enemy rail system. I considered that one of the most important contributions which the air could make to the ground battle, after the launching of the assault, was to continue this work of dislocation. With this view you agreed, as did the other Commanders-in-Chief. 236. In order to gain a clear pifture of the state of enemy road and rail communications, as I saw it at D-Day, reference should be made to the two maps* facing pages 14 and 18. The lines in Northern France and Belgium were very seriously disorganised, but the lines south of Paris/Rheims/Luxembourg were not nearly so devastated, nor were the railways south of the Seine. Of the bridges over the Seine below Paris, all except two were cut, and although the Loire bridges had not been cut, the crossings at Tours, Orleans, Angers and Saumur had all been rendered impassable by attacks on the railway junctions. In addition, there had been an enormous reduction in the capacity of the whole rail system in Northern France and Belgium. 237. The interruption of enemy communications during the post assault phase falls naturally into two separate periods:— (a) From the moment the contending armies had joined battle, it became of paramount importance that the enemy should be denied the freedom of movement necessary to prepare and mount successful counterattacks, and that the reinforcements he sought to bring into the battle zone should not only be hampered in movement, but also subjected to the severest casualties possible by air attack. (b) After the break through of the Allied armies, the task of the air forces against communications was to harry the fleeing enemy columns, block the denies and police the river crossings, thereby removing thtel possibility of orderly retreat. In the following paragraphs I try to show how these two tasks were carried out. 238. Attacks on Rail and Road Systems— June and July.—In the earlier part of this period I was concerned to impose the maximum delay and to inflict the heaviest casualties on the flow of reinforcements and supplies to the enemy armies. The attacks were carried out according to a prepared pattern. This pattern was necessarily developed as the situation changed, following the information I received from deep and ta